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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how forestry joint ventures between 
Indigenous People and the forest Industry are building Indigenous capacities for economic 
development.
A review of literature surrounding applied economic development theories and policy 
regimes related to development of Indigenous People in British Columbia, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand demonstrates an increasing trend of private sector-indigenous partnerships 
in natural resource development. A case study examination of forestry joint ventures in 
north-central British Columbia demonstrated local elements of emerging Indigenous-Industry 
policy regimes and showed that capacity-building elements articulated in development 
theories of community and aboriginal economic development (CED/AED) are linked to 
venture successes.
Activities involved in joint ventures do address and/or introduce aspects of capacity 
building for AED. Nonetheless, joint venture activities do not completely fulfil criteria of an 
ideal approach to AED. Generally, there are no mechanisms involved that provide inclusive 
community participation, conflict resolution and integration of culture in either venture- 
related activities or the determination of the overall nature of local economic development 
and share of benefits. First Nations do not retain full ownership of the factors of economic 
production nor do they share control with Industry or the government in the management of 
natural resources on traditional territories.
The utility of joint venture activities to widely address capacity-building was limited 
by a number of factors: timber supply licenses are often limiting; ventures were often viewed 
from a short-term, retum-on-investment economic perspective; minimized-risk ownership 
levels may limit greater First Nation participation in management and future increases in 
ownership; First Nation partners involved in consortia suffered from inter-Nation conflict; 
few opportunities for on-going advanced training and resource-planning experience were 
available for First Nation employees; hardly any culturally-sensitive management approaches 
were applied; and overall relations between First Nations and Industry are often antagonistic.
It is apparent that capacity building may be better facilitated if both partners support 
and invest in capacity-building activities for joint ventures. Greater investment in capacity- 
building activities is possible if both partners can realize the mutual benefits of joint ventures.
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Introduction
Joint ventures and other collaborative economic partnerships are considered a key 
means to bypass market barriers (i.e. tariffs, protection of national industries) related to 
nationally or culturally imposed political boundaries (Marti & Smiley, 1993; Wilkins, 1993). 
Most commonly used in international business and natural resource exploration, joint 
ventures characteristically involve a large multinational firm privately collaborating with a 
smaller firm - often familiar with, and/or located near, the place of the venture - for mutual 
benefit. In order to gain access to new markets, the large firm provides capital and technical 
know-how while the smaller firm contributes labour and local knowledge about government 
regulations and operating conditions.
Joint ventures discussed in this paper are private economic collaborations influenced 
by government incentives and intervention. Nation-states have provided incentives to entice 
joint venturing between multinational and local firms, especially in the development of 
natural resources such as gas, oil and minerals. In more recent times, beginning most 
forcefully in the 1970s, Less Industrialized Countries (LICs) adjusted their policies to 
promote joint venturing with foreign industry in order to increase investment; improve local 
ownership in economic activities; stimulate local supply industries; and access foreign 
expertise (Franko, 1989; Battat, Frank & Shen, 1996).
Joint Ventures and Aboriginal Economic Development
Following the dramatic expansion of both multinational enterprises and advanced 
country commitments to international development following the Second World War, 
governments were interested in increasing the participation of Indigenous and rural people in 
industrial ventures. Typically, localized mega-projects such as hydropower/irrigation dams 
and oil/gas/mineral exploitation provided Indigenous and rural people with limited duration
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employment opportunities. In an attempt to stimulate longer-term, spin-off economic 
opportunities, commonwealth governments such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia in 
the early 1970s, pushed for such things as preferential employment for Indigenous People and 
joint venture opportunities (Young; 1995; Durie, 1998; Frideres, 1998). As a result, joint 
ventures typically involved minority equity participation or wholly-owned contracting 
companies who carried out limited functions within a given project. Both types of ventures 
were characteristically localized and limited Indigenous participation in strategic 
management of businesses and resources.
Since the 1970s there has been a modest increase in the number of companies entering 
into co-operative agreements with local firms, as well as Indigenous People (Mariti and 
Smiley, 1993). Especially notable are increases in natural resource extraction industries 
including those in forestry and forest plantations (PAO, 1997). In nations that provide 
significant recognition of Indigenous rights - as is the case in Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada - there has been a trend for resource extraction industries to venture with Indigenous 
People and include improved economic development strategies such as trusts, scholarships, 
training opportunities, and some degree of participation in management (Sloan and Hill,
1995: Kauffman, 1998). However, these early ventures such as activities associated with the 
Mackenzie Pipeline in Canada (I970s-1980s), typically did not address Indigenous self- 
determination with respect to economic development and management/co-management of 
traditional lands and resources (Tester, 1984; Anderson, 1998; Frideres, 1998). Indigenous 
management and employment skills were typically directed to highly specialized extraction 
technologies that may or may not be useful in local development once a particular resource is 
eventually exhausted (Frideres, 1998). Overall, oil/gas/mineral venture benefits were 
characterized as being very localized to communities directly impacted by operations.
An imperative for increased Indigenous participation in economic development has 
emerged over the last few decades with the global concern over the sustainability of human 
growth and enterprise with respect to the natural and cultural environment (World Resources 
Institute, 1985). For centuries, forest flora and fauna have provided for the material needs of 
Indigenous People in the form of food, medicines, building materials, and fuel wood for heat 
and light. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimated that about 
70% of people in developing countries - most of whom are located in rural areas and are of 
Indigenous descent - rely on forests for basic economic requirements (World Resources 
Institute, 1985). Tied with a tradition of forest use is also a cultural and spiritual connection 
that remains a source of meaning and wellbeing for Indigenous People. However, as modem 
industrial expansion and subsequent exploitation of natural resources extends further into all 
reaches of the globe, traditional lifestyles, as well as the very survival of Indigenous People 
as a distinct people and society, are increasingly at risk at two broad fronts. First, land and 
natural resources that remain the basis of traditional activities and cultural meaning are 
continually shrinking due to alternative uses and alienation through private and/or national 
imperatives. Secondly, the development of natural resources constitutes the only means of 
acquiring economic resources by which minority Indigenous groups can seek to assert their 
rights, achieve representation and influence government policies. However, substantial social 
and economic barriers exist with respect to Indigenous access to the means for modem 
economic exploitation of natural resources.
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) warned 
that leaving Indigenous People out of modem industrial development would inevitably lead 
to such environmental catastrophes as mass erosion of productive land, species extinction and 
deforestation. A major WCED recommendation sought the efforts of states, NGOs and the 
private sector to both include and facilitate the participation of Indigenous People
participation in the economic development of natural resources (WCED, 1987). The 
subsequent conferences and conventions of the 1992 United Nations’ Conference on the 
Environment and Development solidified commitments to, and mapped the course for, 
increased Indigenous participation in development through such efforts as the Rio 
Declaration (1992), Agenda 21, the Biodiversity Convention and the Intergovernmental 
Forum on Forests' (1997) sustainability criteria and indicator initiatives (Smith, 1998, p.327).
With respect to Indigenous People and their communities, national governments and 
international development agencies have increasingly adopted more participatory economic 
development strategies such as Community and Aboriginal Economic Development 
(CED/AED)(Nutter and McKnight, 1994; Nthomang and Rankopo, 1997; Shragge, 1997).
CED can be viewed as a multi-dimensional approach to economic development that 
specifically addresses social issues and local empowerment. The central appeal of CED 
approaches are that, on one hand, they promote status quo objectives for economic 
development, yet retain and facilitate the prospect of locally controlled and adapted economic 
systems. Thus, CED involves empowering people to participate in the institutions and 
economic fabric of the modem economy in the context of eventual self-determination (Stein, 
1997). Aboriginal Economic Development (AED) is distinguished from CED in that cultural 
and traditional activities make up central components of socioeconomic capacity-building 
strategies (McLay, 1993). Promotion of language, traditional activities, and culture are 
considered as crucial to promoting lasting economic development in many Indigenous 
communities, as are matters of skills development, education, job readiness programs and so 
on (Skinner, 1997).
Forestry joint ventures
It is difficult to determine the exact number of forestry joint ventures in British 
Columbia and beyond. In studying formal international joint ventures, Mariti and Smiley 
(1993) noted the difficulty in quantifying exact numbers of co-venturing firms using 
collaborative agreements. As most agreements tend to be privately arranged when and where 
needed, there are few official, up-to-date records of them. Second, compared to more-used 
business structures such as the corporation, very little study of collaborative agreements has 
been carried out (Mariti and Smiley, 1993; COFI, 1994). With respect to forestry joint 
ventures in British Columbia (BC), Cradock (1998) observed a general increase in the 
number of Industry collaborations with Indigenous People by quantifying the frequency in 
which they were mentioned in popular media and government policy statements.
Despite having little concrete indication of the number of forestry joint ventures, it is 
apparent that significant changes in international policy and legal interpretation have created 
an environment conducive to their expansion. For governments of less industrialized 
countries and international development agencies, the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization introduced the 1985 global tropical forestry strategy; now known as national 
forest programmes (FAQ, 1996). The strategy envisioned a sustained reduction in poverty by 
stimulating local stewardship opportunities for impoverished citizens through such activities 
as sharecropping-type plantation schemes, collaborative forest-based activities and joint 
ventures (World Resources Institute, 1985).
Although highly influenced by international conventions, promotion of forestry joint 
ventures in Advanced Industrialized Countries (AlCs) is largely the result of recent advances 
in legal recognition of Indigenous rights and interests in lands and resources. In the 
commonwealth countries, determinations such as Canada’s Delgamuukw (1997) and 
Australia’s Mabo (2) (1992) have set legal precedent to stimulate national governments to
renegotiate their social, political and economic relationships with Indigenous People 
(Kauffman, 1998). Since the early 1990s, the BC Government's response to emerging 
Indigenous rights has involved incentives for industrial collaboration through such means as 
the provision of access to timber supply through the Ministry of Forests (MOF) Small 
Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP), financial backing and training support. (BC 
Government, 1991).
Major companies and multinational corporations have, in turn, responded to both 
international conventions and legal uncertainties created by rights litigation by becoming 
more receptive to collaborative ventures with Indigenous People. In Canada, forest 
companies are increasingly providing concessions to and/or drafting specific policies for First 
Nations (Sloan & Hill, 1995).
Forestry joint ventures are occurring most prolifically in the aboriginal rights- 
respecting countries of New Zealand and Canada. In the former, collaborative forestry 
ventures are an increasingly desirable economic strategy for a great proportion of Maori 
interest lands that are unsuitable and/or marginal for the purposes of agriculture or pasture. 
Out of a total of 1.3 million hectares of Maori lands held in common, it is predicted that the 
amount committed to forestry will likely double from 260,000 hectares in 1993 to 
approximately 560,000 hectares over the next 50 years (NZ Forestry, 1996, pi).
In Canada, the BC and federal governments have widely promoted forestry joint 
ventures since the early 1990s as a progressive means of promoting aboriginal economic 
development (BCGov’t, 1991; INAC, 1997; HRDC, 1998). A majority of BC First Nations 
have stated interest in pursuing forestry as an economic development strategy (COFI, 1994). 
Furthermore, many see joint ventures as a means to build member and organizational 
capacities to participate in the global economy (NITA, 1993; Cradock, 1998)
British Columbia has entertained the bulk of forest industry collaborations and joint 
ventures in Canada. The last decade has seen the unprecedented emergence of business joint 
ventures in cutting-edge, value-added wood manufacturing such as engineered structural 
components, finger-joined/laminated timber and paper products. In addition to joint ventures 
there are a whole host of less formalized contract, management and other relatively long-term 
business arrangements (Lewis and Hatton, 1992).
Despite ever-increasing adoption of Indigenous-Industry joint ventures, very little 
research has been carried out to explore the implications (COFI, 1994). The available 
Canadian literature surrounding joint venture implications tends to deal with issues such as 
capacity-building and economic development in a highly generalized manner. Brubacher 
(1998a) employed several case studies to develop a very simple assessment framework to 
analyze factors of success and failure in joint ventures. Anderson (1999) viewed joint 
ventures in Canada as representing an Indigenous inspired economic development strategy 
for improving the capacity of leaders in the Indigenous civil sector to both better articulate 
community concerns and to strategically negotiate and plan socioeconomic developments. 
Cradock (1998) considered joint ventures as a critical component for First Nations to 
maximize global economic opportunity in a re-emerging aboriginal political economy.
Lewis and Hatton (1992) commented on the potential of joint ventures to provide additional 
economic and social benefits as compared to simply jobs, equity and income typical of 
customary industry activity with First Nations. Case study examples of First Nation-lndustry 
joint venture-type partnerships abound in such media as business development conference 
proceedings, magazines, association publications and government documents.
Approach
This thesis sets out to examine how forestry joint venture partnerships with industry 
contribute to aboriginal economic development. The broad questions posed are: How do such 
economic partnerships build the capacities of Indigenous People for economic development? 
Are broad Indigenous expectations for capacity-building met through economic partnerships?
In this thesis I address the goals through the following objectives:
• To situate aboriginal economic development in the context of mainstream economic 
development by exploring theoretical and applied approaches.
• To explore Indigenous and natural resource development policy regimes involved in the 
cases of New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the Province of BC for commonalties with 
respect to private sector-indigenous partnerships as an economic development strategy.
• Establish whether formal forestry joint venture examples from BC involve major capacity 
building components as outlined in AED/CED literature and explore how they contribute 
to relative successes.
The inspiration for examining AED capacity-building in the context of Indigenous- 
Forest Industry economic partnerships is twofold. First, given BC examples of partnerships 
established through joint ventures, it seems the right mix of government incentives, and legal 
and political recognition of First Nation rights may guide similar phenomena in natural 
resource development in an international context. Second, as partnerships are popularly 
deemed an appropriate and empowering component of aboriginal economic development, it 
is important that the claim be explored. This is especially true in light of commonly held 
notions that a competitive business is an inappropriate level at which to address 
socioeconomic development issues (Elias, 1991; COFI, 1995).
A number of methods will be used to explore how joint ventures are building the 
Indigenous capacities for economic development. In chapter one, I examine hroad trends in 
government and development agency approaches to economic development with Indigenous 
People, In chapter two, an analysis of policy regimes surrounding natural resource and 
Indigenous economic development in the varying political contexts of the case countries 
illustrates the increased importance of private sector-indigenous partnerships in economic 
development. Chapter three outlines the methodology used to investigate the thesis 
questions and justifies the use of a multiple-case study approach. Chapter four examines how 
a number of joint ventures in BC are developing First Nation capacities for AED. Chapter 
five provides a discussion of case study implications and recommendations with respect to 
capacity building in joint ventures and broader policy regimes. Chapter six presents the 
conclusions of the thesis and suggests some further areas of research.
Chapter One
Approaches to E2conomic Development with Indigenous People
Definitions
Traditional People, Native, Indian and Aboriginal are often terms interchangeably 
used to describe people of distinct ethnic and societal background whose occupancy of given 
areas pre-dates Westphalian concepts of territoriality. With respect to the people this thesis is 
geared towards, I will use the term ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Indigenous People’. This term is adapted 
from a Canadian legal term of Aboriginal People as “...the descendants of most of those who 
have inhabited the land since time immemorial...” (Pointing as cited in Brubacher, 1998b, 
p.l). The term ‘Industry’ refers mainly to large corporate entities, especially multinational 
corporations.
Approaches to Economic Development
As will be discussed, prior to recent community-centric approaches to economic 
development for Indigenous People, government approaches centred largely on assimilating 
local people into national economies. Early approaches focused on social and cultural 
assimilation while later forms centred on economic assimilation.
In the early twentieth century, national governments commonly believed that the 
barriers to economic development of Indigenous People were rooted in their general lack of 
formal education and conformity to western social norms (Innis, 1962; Armitage, 1995;
Ferro, 1997; Frideres, 1998). Participants at the 1961 Native Welfare Conference of Federal 
and State Ministers in Australia put forward this definition which captures the official stance 
many governments world-wide held regarding the development of Indigenous People:
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“The policy of assimilation means that all Aborigines and part-Aborigines are 
expected to attain the same manner of living as other Australians and to live as 
members of a single Australian community, enjoying the same rights and privileges, 
accepting the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs as other Australians” 
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 1986, p.37).
Given such sentiments, many governments developed socially disruptive policies that 
paved the way for assimilation to impact Indigenous People in a far-reaching, systematic 
way. Under legislation such as the Indian Act (1876) in Canada and ‘Protection of 
Aborigines’ Statutes (1869-1909) in Australia, dramatic methods of assimilation such as 
removal of Indigenous children from their parents and banning of traditional customs were 
implemented nation-wide (Armitage, 1995, p i89-190).
Around the 1970s, governments and aid agencies abandoned outright assimilation 
policies in their attempt to promote economic development of Indigenous People. This 
change can be attributed to both emerging international consensus popularized through 
United Nations and development NGO initiatives, and the failure of previous policies to 
significantly improve economic conditions for Indigenous People (Bodley, 1988). As social 
assimilation policies of economic development began to wane, a more subtle form of 
assimilation replaced them: economic assimilation. From a sociopolitical perspective. 
Indigenous People were no longer considered people to be converted into national majority 
cultures, but rather as ethnic minorities in multi-cultural nation-states. Armitage (1995) uses 
the term ‘integrationist’ to describe the general approach to economic development where 
Indigenous People are officially allowed to retain their ethnic culture and identity but are 
expected to integrate into the larger economy. Early integrationist policies in both case and 
L ie  countries were characterized by a two-pronged strategy; self-sufficient national 
economic growth and an increased focus on development of rural regions and people (Bison, 
1997). Policies generally promoted the most efficient economic entrepreneurs, usually large
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corporate bodies, to invest in the development of rural resources - particularly in energy and 
natural resource exploitation. There was overall confidence that prosperity in larger national 
and regional economies, in terms of burgeoning opportunities, high wages and relatively 
long-term jobs, would also stimulate economic development in the communities of 
Indigenous People.
Although large-scale industrial developments greatly stimulated both local and 
national economies, they failed to provide an overall sustained improvement for Indigenous 
People. In many cases, employment opportunities - dependent on the magnitude of the 
resource to be exploited - were relatively short-term (Page, 1986). Further, many 
employment positions made available to Indigenous People eventually fell into the hands of 
non-indigenous workers who adapted better to the routine of industrial work schedules and/or 
possessed more education/skills (Frideres, 1998). Expected economic spin-offs failed to 
materialize within communities as such activities as service contracts were often awarded to 
more competitive, outside businesses rather than to Indigenous People who, in general, 
lacked critical entrepreneurial skills and/or investment capital. When available, training and 
education programs were mainly geared to getting Indigenous People into the blue collar 
workforce, and did little to improve Indigenous capacities in strategic economic skills such as 
management, administration, investment and enterprise (Young, 1995; Brohman, 1996).
Although integrationist policies generally provide acknowledgement of cultural 
uniqueness, they are heavily infused with a modernization perspective -  which is essentially 
pessimistic about the viability of any Indigenous system of economic organization and 
assumes that with progress, traditional-based economies will succumb to the most efficient, 
rational model: western market economy. (Elias, 1991; Anderson, 1998; Fideres, 1998). This 
assumption continues regardless of the fact that traditional economies have persisted despite
12
centuries of exposure to the modem economic juggernaut and economists’ dire predictions 
(Brodley, 1988; Elias, 1991).
From an economic perspective, international aid agencies were finding that although 
integrationist approaches were apparently increasing economic benefits to LICs, equitable 
distribution of those benefits were lacking. Increasingly, aid agencies began to follow an 
approach to economic development popularized in the World Bank’s famous proclamation 
‘Growth with Equity’ (Elson, 1997). Broadly stated, aid agencies began adopting 
development strategies that both sustain economic growth and distribute the resulting wealth 
more equitably. Poorly developed human elements or 'human capital' of societies in poverty 
were considered major barriers to equitable economic development (Freire, 1993). With 
provision of basic education and health -  ‘basic needs’ - as the main tenets, development 
programs moved to directly target marginalized segments of society (Gultung, 1991).
Yet, basic needs programming failed to provide wide spread improvements in 
economic development. Concurring with recent international development theories of 
participatory development (Chambers, 1993), rural and small community development 
theorists have pointed out that barriers to extensive and equitable economic development lay 
in the lack of local input into and control over factors of economic production (Shragge, 
1997).
Community Economic Development
A new focus on a local or Community Economic Development (CED) approach 
addressed a lack of Indigenous control and involvement in economic development by 
promoting local input into and/or control of the factors of production. The CED approach 
espouses targeted, advanced training/education programs to build local capacities to 
participate in economic development.
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CED advocates that local communities be involved in and eventually ‘self-determine’ 
the nature of local economic development. The CED approach has typically involved 
strategies for improving public participation such areas as democratic organizations and 
meaningful consultation mechanisms, to increase both community control and local 
economic benefits (Broadhead, 1994). It is clear that creating truly participatory and 
independent economic institutions in communities stricken with poverty or lacking education 
is extremely difficult and often subject to failure. Nonetheless, a CED approach anticipates 
that certain interim institutions such as community land trusts, workers’ cooperatives and 
community financial/business institutions can act as organizational frameworks that help 
build community member capacities to achieve a truly participatory form of economic 
development (Shragge, 1997). In the case of Canada and New Zealand, economic institution 
building largely involved making improvements to existing First Nation reserve 
administrations and Maori Land Trusts, respectively. In the case of reserve administrations, 
Canada transferred to them municipal-like authority for social programs in order to promote 
socioeconomic development ‘....based on strong self-governing Bands....’(Elias,1991, p.20). 
With regard to the Land Trusts, legal changes were enacted to enable individual Maori 
Freehold Lands to be amalgamated into larger, economically viable communal units (Tester, 
1984).
While continuing with methods to improve employment skills of community
members, a CED approach emphasizes advanced training and education as critical to overall
improvements in economic development. Training must transcend basic education to include
strategic business management skills in areas such as accounting, business administration and
law (Nthomang and Rankopo, 1997). Popular and motivated individuals within
communities are identified as those best able to secure and manage new economic
opportunities (Paul Mitchell-Banks, Pers. Comm., March, 1998). Their achievements and
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commitment to local economic developments provide positive examples that establish crucial 
community interest and sense of ownership. Incentives such as scholarships and bursaries for 
higher education and trade apprenticeships are made available to both improve motivated 
members’ skills and to encourage other local members to pursue advanced education.
Once organizations and human capacities are developed, economic means and 
recognition are required to give them meaning and the ability to effect change on behalf of 
the community. Without equity stakes in, and control over, economic developments, it has 
been difficult for Indigenous People to obtain any significant degree of influence over 
developments. Various methods have been employed to rectify power imbalances. One 
popular method is the use of legislation and/or codes of conduct requiring governments, 
industry and aid agencies to consult with local people before developments proceed 
(BC Gov’t, 1991; Young, 1995).
Despite the progressive nature of the CED approach sustained improvement of 
economic conditions in Indigenous communities has often failed to take hold. One reason 
for this lack of effectiveness is that the CED approach, as applied, rarely addresses core 
theoretical CED principals. In his examination of CED literature in North America and 
Europe, Fontan (1993) suggested that applied approaches tend to be used according to a 
‘liberal’ perspective. In a liberal perspective, capacity-building elements of CED are applied 
not with the intention of empowering communities to take charge of economic development, 
but rather to reduce socioeconomic barriers to the continuance of status quo, private-sector 
economic development. In this sense, such development approaches could be considered 
subtly integrationist and therefore antagonistic to CED goals and objectives for self- 
determined development.
Ultimately, commonly applied CED approaches do not adequately address Indigenous
desire for self-determination. CED approaches tend to promote limited self-governance
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within established frameworks of national or local governance. The form of self- 
determination widely embraced by Indigenous People is reflected in a statement made by the 
Council of the Canne River MicMacs and Innu Nation Board of Directors in 1995, “..As a 
principal and practice. ...Self determination [as opposed to self-govemance] refers to the right 
and ability of a people or group of people to determine their own destiny. There must be a 
legal, political and structural framework to be ‘sovereign’ and operate as a supreme authority 
within a defined geographic area” (Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), 1995,
P. 8). This framework for ‘sovereignty’ over an area need not be absolute but can also exist 
as meaningful co-management or co-govemance with national governance (Berkes, 1994; 
Campbell, 1996).
Aboriginal Economic Development
In light of the inability of applied CED approaches to effect positive economic 
development in Indigenous communities. Indigenous People themselves have largely 
promoted the concept of Aboriginal Economic Development (AED) (Young, 1995; Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), 1996; Cradock, 1998; Anderson, 1999). 
Although often considered similar or the same as CED, AED is culturally specific and tends 
more to embrace the social change aspects of CED as opposed to ‘liberal’ applications 
(Nutter and McKnight, 1994).
AED addresses an Indigenous desire for self-determination by advocating for their 
ownership and management of resources and industries. As Indigenous People often lack 
critical capital and resources with which to obtain ownership, emphasis is placed on methods 
to establish their rights to lands and resources. Rights-affirming activities include official 
acknowledgement of status (recognition), negotiation of treaties and establishing
proprietorship over traditional knowledge and natural resource uses (RCAP, 1996).
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With ownership comes the possibility for meaningful involvement in, and/or control 
of, governance over areas of Indigenous interests. To make up for lack of capital and 
business ownership, economic partnerships are sought in both public and private sectors to 
help establish more Indigenous ownership and involvement in business activities.
A cornerstone of AED is its emphasis on cultural continuity. It suggests that 
economic capacity building strategies must include a strong cultural component. Accessible 
educational opportunities in traditional activities, languages and customs help community 
members re-establish a sense of identity, worth and purpose. A strong grounding in 
traditional Indigenous economic and cultural activities not only prepare Indigenous People 
for participation in formal economic activities but allow them opportunity to infuse 
traditional values and knowledge into such activities (Nutter and McKnight, 1994).
Anderson (1999) and Cradock (1998) support this by arguing that it is not inevitable that 
Indigenous participation in Industry collaborations will result in eventual Indigenous 
assimilation or incur a state of perpetual underdevelopment and dependency. Rather, there is 
real possibility for Indigenous forms of economic organization to take root and flourish in the 
new global economy (Anderson, 1999).
AED promotes long-term, sustainable economic activities that mesh with cultural 
orientation (McLay, 1993). Activities which are related to or have a stewardship role in the 
management of natural resources such as forestry, fishing and tourism, are especially 
acceptable (NAPA, 1997). Further, cultural sensitivity should pervade all development 
activities such as training and organizational management style.
To address Indigenous concerns over ’appropriate’ industrial activities, cultural
continuity, marginalized community status and especially the sustainability of economic
activities, an AED approach suggests that development activities be guided by needs
identified by Indigenous People themselves (RCAP, 1996). Further, developments should be
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structured in ways that provide a sense of recognition of inherent Indigenous interests and 
rights to lands and resources. Recognition can be manifested in a number of ways that 
include respectful conduct in on-going developments; arranging agreements in ways which 
avoid compromising higher Indigenous goals (i.e. land claims); and/or providing official 
acknowledgement of both defined and undefined aboriginal rights. Meaningful recognition 
also includes consideration of Indigenous partners’ conditions of underdevelopment and 
marginalization when undertaking specific economic activities (Bryant, 1994).
Applications of AED have typically faced problems similar to the CED approach; 
namely a lack of a widespread transfer of local control and ownership over lands and 
resources. National governments and private industry are resistant to transferring rights to 
lands and resources to Indigenous People. Further, many AED approach activities such as 
progressive joint ventures in the mining sector have tended to impact relatively few 
Indigenous People and communities. According to Kaufmann (1998) and Young (1995), 
historic industrial partnership promotions in Canada and Australia were typically enacted 
only with Indigenous communities immediately effected by mining/petroleum operations of 
limited geographic scope. Further, equity stakes in such partnerships were often minority 
shares and/or afforded minimal participation in management of operations.
Joint Venture Partnerships
Over the last decade joint ventures between Industry and Indigenous People have 
emerged as an important component of AED strategies. Joint ventures link needed 
employment and economic development with access to such things as financial resources, 
technical “know-how”, on-the-job training and management participation. As compared to 
the commonly used business partnership which largely shares only profit, McKee (1995)
points out that sharing of production output is an important distinguishing feature of a JV.
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Production output includes not only capital, but also, important technology and information 
transfer such as techniques, data, and management experience gained through venture 
operations.
Joint ventures address fundamental Indigenous concerns over ownership and co­
management by providing equity, management responsibilities and technology transfer with 
respect to industrial and resource management activities (Lewis & Hutton, 1992). In cases 
where outright ownership is not conferred to Indigenous People, alternative forms of 
ownership are typically sought. Although development of alternative forms of ownership or 
tenure for AED are still relatively new and evolving, some examples include long-term land 
and resource leasing arrangements (i.e. industrial site rentals or housing projects); mining and 
energy; and forestry resource tenures which do not alienate areas from Indigenous land 
claims (NITA, 1993; NZ Forestry, 1996; van Hattem, 1998; Foy and Pitcher, 1999).
Equity involvement in joint ventures affords Indigenous People relative levels of co­
management responsibilities in such things as shareholder committees. Boards of Directors, 
and operational management. In such positions. Indigenous People enjoy direct input and, in 
the case of a Board, rights to a binding vote on broad management decisions.
The characteristic that sets joint ventures apart from previous partnerships is that co­
parties share responsibilities according to the spirit and intent of and/or legal requirements in 
a relationship known as a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) (Bean, 1995). Admittedly, as 
the case of the forest industry in B.C. illustrates, the vast proportion of Indigenous 
partnerships are not JVs by legal definition. However, as I will explore in the following 
chapters, many JVs are increasingly being carried out according to an informal, if not a 
formal JOA model.
Although highly dependent on the nature of business activities, JO As nonetheless are
similar in their basic framework: parties are brought together through common goals and
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interests to pursue a single, limited project - usually distinct from the co-venturers’ main 
business interests (Revenue Canada, 1995). All parties are co-owners of venture assets with 
one party acting as a manager, while the supervision of the activities is jointly controlled 
through an operating committee (Bean, 1995). JOAs also impart fiduciary responsibilities 
upon venture partners. Broadly stated, such a responsibility requires that all individual 
partners -  especially the dominant operator -  relinquish self interest and act for the mutual 
benefit of the co-owners (Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia 
(CLESBC), 1998, p. 4.1.06).
By establishing fiduciary responsibilities that are legally binding on all parties, a JOA 
approach addresses disparity in power and influence Indigenous partners may face in a 
business venture. As arbitration, legal or otherwise, is limited to the terms of the JOA, there 
is incentive for parties to immediately address potential problems concerning the JV 
relationship through their JOA negotiations. Without a relationship requiring parties to ‘get 
it right’ in the beginning, there may be a propensity to ignore uncomfortable issues such as 
interests for future increases in Indigenous ownership or management levels, which, if left 
long enough, may prove disastrous for the long term viability of a business venture. Once a 
strong JOA is established it can be used as an important framework that partners can refer to 
in order to solve problems related to unforeseen events such as economic downturns or 
changes in partner ownership (Bean, 1995; Brubacher, 1998).
Both the JV’s successful application as a prominent vehicle for international business 
ventures and its appeal to those interested in AED are linked to a JOA’s ability to incorporate 
many important non-economic, social and culturally-related considerations through a 
negotiation process (Battat et al, 1996). Some examples of social-cultural issues that can 
arise during negotiations include criticism of management style and bias, gender and racial
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equity in employment positions, cultural sensitivity/adaptability and any social disadvantages 
that may inherently exist with respect to a co-venturer.
JVs are not simply a business tool, but also a conduit for government programming. 
Attempts are made to bundle training and capacity building programs into the ‘real’ context 
of a business venture (British Columbia Ministry of Forests (MOF), 1998; Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), 1998). In such settings, delivered training concepts stand a 
better chance of being retained by beneficiaries when they are reinforced through hands-on 
application.
Particularly in the development of natural resources, joint ventures have been 
embraced by governments, industry and the public as a preferred and popular means of 
economic development for Indigenous People (Government of BC, 1991; NAFA, 1997; 
HRDC, 1998). In the countries of Canada, New Zealand and Australia, forestry and non­
renewable resources industries have been the most prolific sectors involved in JVs. In many 
cases, such partnerships have formed spontaneously through private industry and Indigenous 
initiatives (Sloan and Hill, 1995). Admittedly, JVs have not been widely adopted in countries 
-  especially LICs -  where recognition of Indigenous rights and interests are not as advanced 
as, for example, in the commonwealth countries. However, as the availability of 
commercially-developable lands unencumbered by communal or native claim shrinks, 
commercial forestry partnerships such as JVs will become more commonplace (Anderson, 
1999; Asiapulse, 1999; Foy and Pitcher, 1999).
Although it is widely acknowledged in the CED literature that JVs are simply
components of an overall AED strategy, popular expectations have idealized them as a ‘must
have’ component. In his examination of Indigenous-Industrial partnerships in Canada,
Ferrazi (1989) cautioned proponents about the importance of recognizing the value of JVs as
means to greater goals rather than ends. In many cases. Indigenous communities focused on
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JVs as ‘the’ economic development strategy and not simply as part of a larger overall 
strategy. Despite cautions, governments in Canada, especially the Province of BC, have 
made JV promotion a central component of their AED strategies (INAC, 1997; MOF, 1998). 
Since JVs are applied in the context of already existing AED program initiatives (and even 
facilitate their delivery), government promoters seem to imply that widespread promotion of 
JVs can be seen as a valid or even improved AED approach in and of itself (INAC, 1997).
Others view a JV approach as possibly adverse to AED goals and objectives by 
putting more emphasis on short-term gains as opposed to longer-term political negotiations to 
secure outright land/resource ownership and equitable co-management with governments 
(Berkes, 1994; Campbell, 1996). In fact, a number of north central BC First Nations and 
non-aboriginal people I talked with during this research felt that JVs did not substantially 
change existing economic and social conditions. To them, JVs are characterized as ‘business 
as usual' - some First Nation members getting rich, the resource base steadily depleting and 
progress in land claims and treaties changing little.
This chapter has served to illustrate major capacity-building elements of CED/AED 
approaches and how they have influenced economic development in the case countries 
examined. The following list of insights into the economic approaches and capacity building 
in the context of joint ventures serve to both summarize the main gist of the chapter and 
provide the criteria with which the BC joint venture case studies will be assessed:
♦ Ventures should seek to maximize levels of Indigenous employment - including 
marginalized members of Indigenous societies such as women, the under-skilled and the 
handicapped.
♦ Local ownership of productive assets by Indigenous People is key to an AED strategy.
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♦ Equal or greater participation in management should include not only involvement in 
venture operations but also natural resource management aspects. Participation should 
extend beyond broad authorities of BODs and into day-to-day operations.
♦ Ventures should include widely available and diverse training opportunities in such 
areas as management, business, cross-cultural education, design, and marketing.
♦ Advanced education opportunities such as scholarships and apprenticeships in technical, 
business and resource management training should be made available for Indigenous 
workers.
♦ Industry and Indigenous partners should improve relations through extension of support 
to cultural and community activities that develop a sense of community ownership over 
venture activities.
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Chapter Two
Policy Regimes of Natural Resource-Based Economic Development with
Indigenous People
The previous chapter examined the trend for economic development programs applied 
by governments of such countries as Canada and New Zealand, to increasingly incorporate 
principles of Aboriginal Economic Development/Community Economic Development in 
approaches to promoting economic development and Industry joint ventures with Indigenous 
People. However, as the phenomenon of joint ventures in any given nation-state arises from 
unique historic, sociopolitical, legal and geographic circumstances, a question remains: are 
the experiences of Indigenous-Industry joint ventures emerging in places like New Zealand 
and Canada applicable to other nation-state jurisdictions?
To explore the applicability of BC forestry joint venture experiences to other 
jurisdictions, a policy analysis of Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian government 
approaches to natural resources and the development of Indigenous People will be elaborated 
below. In this chapter, I will argue that changing interests and relationships between major 
stakeholders are resulting in the emergence of new and potentially stable institutional patterns 
of decision making, negotiation and agreement that highlight increased Industry partnerships 
with Indigenous People.
Using the concept of government policy environments as an analytical context is 
appropriate as national governments and their delegated regional authorities (i.e. states, 
provinces, etc.) are custodians and administrators of legal rights with respect to any nation­
state. Industry remains highly dependent on governments for such things as access to 
resources and setting reasonable regulations for carrying out economic activities. Policy 
direction in natural resource development is highly influenced by a close relationship
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between Industry and governments - whose interests with respect to economic development 
often run in parallel (Hessing and Hewlett, 1997). Governments also play a dominant role in 
programming for social and economic development for the public and Indigenous People 
within the nation state.
I first provide a brief introduction to the concepts and components of policy regimes; 
actors, institutions, and ideas. I then go on to make a closer examination of policy regimes 
surrounding the utilization of natural resources and economic development for Indigenous 
Peoples in three countries: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. From this point I explore 
commonalties of the policy regimes examined at a national level to those existing at sub­
national levels by outlining the particular case of forestry and economic development of First 
Nations in the Canadian province of British Columbia. I then conclude by arguing that all 
examined countries demonstrate a newly emerging policy regime that is characterized by 
enhanced relationships between governments, private industry and Indigenous People.
Policy background
In countries with liberal democratic governments, public policy-making as a problem­
solving tool often follows what is known as the policy cycle process: a) problem recognition 
b) proposal of solution c) decision making d) implementation and e) evaluation (Hessing and 
Howlett, 1997, p.97). In the case of policies related to Indigenous-Industry economic 
partnerships, concerns are typically discussed and information shared between central parties 
or policy actors (i.e. industry, government. Indigenous People, public, etc.) involved in the 
decision-making process within a particular planning sector (i.e. natural resource 
development and local economic development). Decision-makers then choose among a 
number of policy courses-of-action to which they will subsequently attach sanctions in order
to ensure comphance. Policies are then implemented through courts and governments until
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they are finished or cancelled. Ideally, results of the policies are evaluated against goals and 
objectives of the original decision-makers (Hessing and Howlet, 1997).
I will use Hoberg and Morawski’s (1997) conception of policy regimes -  the triad of 
actors, institutions and ideas - to explore government policy outcomes related to Indigenous - 
Industry economic partnerships (p.389). Specifically, significant occurrences in natural 
resources and the development of Indigenous People will be analyzed with respect to 
prevailing ideas, actors and institutions involved.
The policy regime approach suggests that as policy outcomes are the result of 
interactions between regime components, a causal relationship exists between policy change 
and regime component changes. Regime component changes are conceptualized as the 
result of the intersection of regime actors and institutions of discreet pohcy sectors (i.e. 
resource development, Indigenous development). Policy sector intersections are considered 
to be motivated by two broad means: a) socioeconomic or political disruptions that include 
what Hessing and Howlett (1997) describe as paradigm shifts, and b) strategic political 
maneuvering by actors whose actions are largely influenced by ideology and institutional 
contexts.
I take a traditional pluralist standpoint^ by viewing actors in natural resource 
development as industries and their lobby groups; delegated levels of government (Federal, 
State, etc.) representatives of Indigenous People (Tribal Councils & Corporations, Band 
Governments, etc.) and publics (NGOs, Lobbies, committees). Institutions refer to 
characteristic ‘inner workings’ or structures within regimes such as the manner in which 
decisions are made in governance systems. Hoberg and Morawskis’ (1997) conception of 
regime ideas is similar to Hessing and Howletts’ (1997) definition of policy paradigms as the
‘ Where interest and lobby groups are key influences in policy decision making
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“...underlying beliefs, values and attitudes connected with public problems and the solutions 
to them...” (p.lOl)
As un-alienated public lands make up the majority of national land area in all case 
countries discussed here, related policy regimes are an important focus of this study. Policies 
affecting public lands have the potential to touch a large number of Indigenous People, 
regardless of whether or not they are involved in treaty processes and other agreements.
Natural Resource Development Policy Regimes: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
Regime Components
As outlined by Dickerson and Flanagan (1988), Australia and Canada share a federal 
parliamentary system where the authority to govern and establish laws consistent with the 
judiciary are at a national and regional level. Although Australia’s States and Territories 
have freedom to draft their own legislation and policies, such enactments must be consistent 
with the national Constitution. With respect to issues of national importance in Canada, 
Federal Government relations with the relatively autonomous Provinces and Territories are 
carried out in a more diplomatic fashion through such means as ministerial negotiations and 
conferences. On the other hand. New Zealand - and the majority of nation-states in the world 
-  has a unitary system of parliament where a sovereign central government delegates by 
statute, constituent governments (municipal, county, etc.) and/or regional governments.
As ex-British colonies, all three countries’ relationships with Indigenous People are 
historically defined through treaty making and government statutes. Indigenous People 
emerged with constitutional recognition, limited title to some lands but no sovereign 
authority. Legal uncertainty surrounding past treaties and rights to public lands have led
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governments and Indigenous People to negotiate modem new treaties and re-negotiate 
unsound old treaties.
Indigenous People^ are very unique actors in policy regimes: their socioeconomic 
status is far below that of non-aboriginals; in BC, Australia and New Zealand they are 
characterized by below average life expectancies, infant survival, employment levels and 
higher rates of suicide, family violence and substance abuse (Durie, 1994, pl32; Young,
1995; KPMG, 1996, p2I). Generally, Indigenous People also suffer from a lack of formal 
skills and education; In 1994, three quarters of BC First Nation members had not completed 
high school (COFI, 1994); and 63% of all New Zealand Maori had no educational credentials 
(Durie, 1994, pl32).
Indigenous People are disadvantaged, distinct people whose affairs have largely been 
dictated by non-local governments (Frideres,I998). They are largely at the mercy of nation­
state governments and majority populations whose interests are often threatened by political 
and legal advancement of Indigenous rights to such things as resources, title and governance. 
Unlike public actors such as NGOs, which are relatively independent of governments and can 
raise private funds, minority Indigenous People often lack financial, institutional and 
technological means by which to effectively promote their interests.
 ^Used in this section to refer to the larger linguistic groupings associated with the respective case examples: 
The Polynesian Maori of New Zealand, the Koori (Aborigines and Islanders) of Australia and the First Nations 
of Canada.
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Industry- Government Policy Regimes
Natural resource development is an important component in all the economies of the 
case example countries. Although mining and petroleum product development are important 
economic industries in all countries, forestry in Canada and New Zealand represents an 
especially important economic activity in that opportunities are available to a greater number 
of Indigenous People over a wide geographic area. In 1998, mining provided Australia with 
approximately 36 billion Australian dollars in export earnings (Kauffman, 1998), while 
natural resources production in Canada represented a trade surplus of 45 billion Canadian 
dollars (Hessing and Howlett, 1997). Excepting the petroleum industry, the largest primary 
producer in New Zealand in 1997 was forestry with sales of goods and services of 
approximately 2.3 billion New Zealand dollars (Te Manau Ngaherehere, 1997).
Prior to the mid-1980s, the main actors dominating natural resource development 
policy regimes in all case countries were Industry and governments. Government policy 
approaches were characterized by a paradigm with a focus on self-sufficient national 
economic development and large-scale resource development schemes in hinterland regions 
(Elson, 1997). In the case countries, the idea of Indigenous People and public participation in 
natural resource development had taken root from political and legal influences of the 1960s- 
70s. Many legal acts and government ministries involved in guiding policy for mining, oil & 
gas and forestry were reorganized to include Indigenous and local peoples’ concerns as well 
as consideration for environmental impacts (Dixon, Ericksen and Gunn, 1989; Horsley, 1989; 
Young, 1995).
Although the idea of participation by Indigenous People in natural resources
development emerged decades before, meaningful and wide-spread efforts did not really take
root until the World Commission on Economic Development’s (WCED) conception of
sustainable development was widely popularized in 1987. As well as entrenching the ethic of
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public participation in resource development in general, the WCED strategy stressed that 
sustainable development required that Indigenous People - with their knowledge and 
understanding of the natural environment -  be fully included in all future developments 
(WCED, 1987).
Prior to the sustainable development era, newly developed institutions that included 
mandates to address the concerns of Indigenous People in natural resource-use were 
characteristically administered through government agencies and personnel who were pro 
status quo development and, in general, lacked sympathy for the aspirations of Indigenous 
People. In New Zealand, modified resources-related acts such as the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1977) and Mining Act (1971) remained biased against Maori interests as they 
were administered under the ‘pro industrial development’ Ministry of Works and 
Development (Dixon et al., 1989, p. 148). Australia’s participation-friendly planning and 
environment legislation was substantially watered down in 1979 in effort to “.. .reduce the 
Planning and Environment Minister’s power to intervene in the business of government 
authorities.”(Taplin, 1989, p.22).
Enhanced Participation for Indigenous People
The early 1990s ushered in a series of new institutions that entrenched widespread
Indigenous participation in resource management issues. Under New Zealand’s Resource
Management Act (RMA) (1991), resource developers must obtain “resource consents” from
local authorities (Regional, District, or City Councils) for access to public lands and
resources (Te Puni Kokiri, 1999). Maori interests are specifically considered by local
authorities in two ways: first, plans must include written statements as to how local Maori
interests will be accommodated. Second, the local authorities have the power to require that
developers secure written consent of local Maori who are affected by developments. In
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Australia, the Native Title Act (NTA) (1993) requires developers to negotiate with (and in 
some cases identify) Koori claimants about prospective activities with respect to large areas 
of Australia lands unencumbered by past enactment (Altman, 1995). Major promotion of 
First Nation participation in natural resource developments in Canada, not only includes 
mandated legislation (i.e. Forestry Act (1989)), but also inter-provincial conferences and 
programming such as the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers’ sustainable forestry strategy 
in 1992 and the Canadian Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy (CAEDS) in 1989 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2000). Through the federal conventions, as well as individual 
efforts, the provinces increasingly required input of Indigenous People into resource use 
decision-making. For example, land use in BC must be consistent with the requirement of the 
Forest Practices Code BC Act (1996) for First Nations’ input into higher-level planning. The 
CAEDS program provided support for native capital corporations and made available 
financing to encourage partnerships and joint ventures between First Nation and non­
aboriginal actors in resource development.
The advent of popular concern over environmental degradation and status quo 
economic development in the late 1980s, resulted in substantial changes in actors, institutions 
and ideas that dramatically changed natural resource development policies in all of the case 
countries. For the first time, Indigenous People were considered key stakeholders in natural 
resource development of public lands.
Indigenous People-Government Policy Regimes
This section examines the progressive involvement of Indigenous People in economic 
and natural resource development in the three case countries. Through an examination of a 
series of consequential development programs and activities, this section outlines how
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associated development policy regimes characterized by a strong relationship between 
governments and Indigenous People increasingly involve the private sector.
Actors
Prior to the era of widespread legal and political recognition of Indigenous rights and 
interests in natural resource development from the late 1980s onwards, central actors 
involved in policy regimes surrounding Indigenous economic and natural resource 
development were governments and Indigenous People. Governments have control over two 
very important determinants in the economic development of Indigenous People: land and 
resources and the agenda for economic development programming. Government actors vary 
considerably depending, for example, on how authorities are delegated. In Canada, both the 
federal and provincial/territorial governments share responsibilities for First Nation interests 
in economic developments - including those related to natural resources. In the 
provinces/territories, the federal government holds responsibility for honoring treaties and 
administering affairs related to First Nations on lands reserved for them. Provinces and 
territories, on the other hand, have autonomy over natural resources (excepting waterways) 
and their own government programs for Indigenous People (Young, 1995). Similar to 
Canada, states and territories in Australia have autonomy over their programming for land 
use, while the Commonwealth government manages for the interests of all the nation’s Koori 
(Kauffman, 1998). In New Zealand, the central government holds central responsibility for 
Maori-related policies and administration of all public resources (Conservation Estate) but 
delegates considerable governing authority to regions and districts (Durie, 1998).
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Industry’s involvement in this regime is diminished due to the fact that they have little 
authority over how public lands and resources are used, and respond mainly to market forces 
as opposed to social concerns.^
The hegemony of governments’ role in this regime cannot be attributed to a lack of 
Indigenous desire to be involved. Self-determined socioeconomic development has long 
been the agenda of Indigenous People (Elias, 1991; Young, 1995; Durie, 1998). With much 
of their energies and meager resources directed to petitioning governments and seeking legal 
help. Indigenous voice and ambitions for economic development were subdued. However, 
with moral backing derived from developments related to the UN’s ‘third world’ 
decolonization initiatives in the 1960s, empowered Indigenous advocates went on to secure a 
number of landmark political and legal determinations (Young, 1995). Determinations that 
served to elevate Indigenous status as regime actor included: the recognition of Indigenous 
title to lands and resources in the Calder (1973) case in Canada; the right to contest treaty 
decisions through New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975); and the securing of title to 
reserved lands through the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act (1976) (ALRA) in Australia 
(Young, 1995; Kauffman, 1998).
Ideas
As touched on in the earlier chapter, the changes taking shape in the 1970s ushered in 
new ideas and institutions with respect to land and economic programming. First, Indigenous 
People could no longer be viewed as merely disadvantaged ethnic citizens but rather as a 
legally distinct people. Emphasis of development programming shifted from promotion of
 ^However it is important to note that despite lack of authority over lands, industry invokes powerful political 
lobbies such as the Council of Forest Industries of BC and the Minerals Council of Australia, to resist any 
changes to status quo land and resource use designations (COFI, 1995; Altman, 1995)
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economic development for individuals to include community and communal options. With 
respect to land, it was realized that Indigenous People should be more directly involved in 
contemporary land and resource management, beyond simply that related to traditional 
practices and ownership. Ideas coalesced to converge into a new paradigm of self- 
determined economic development for Indigenous People.
Institutions
A number of new institutions evolved as a result of regime changes. In terms of land 
and resources, the Calder (1973) decision spurred the introduction of the Canada 
Comprehensive Claims Policy. Negotiations under the policy opened up nearly 600,000 
square kilometres of land in the NWT, Yukon and Northern Quebec for potential First Nation 
ownership (Young, 1995, p.56). In BC, the government made some limited changes to forest 
tenure arrangement (i.e. Babine Forest Product’s Forest License) obligations were modified 
to include requirements for increased First Nation participation in forestry activities. In 
Australia’s Northern Territory -  the home of the majority of Koori - the Aboriginal Land 
Fund Commission (ALFC) was formed to purchase unalienated public lands under leasehold 
for Koori purposes. Other states followed suit with such mechanisms as Koori-managed 
perpetual leaseholds in Queensland and Aboriginal Land Trusts in Western Australia (Young, 
1995, p.63). In New Zealand, the Maori Affairs Act (1953) was amended to create Section 
483 Trusts that allowed Maori land owners greater freedom from restrictive government 
control (Harris, 1997). All new land institutions served to provide Indigenous People greater 
control over lands and resources which in turn could be used to stimulate economic 
development.
Which have evolved into what are now known as Ahuwhenua Trusts
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With respect to government economic development programming, institutions 
changed or were introduced to include more community and communal-targeted options as 
opposed to those focused on individuals. According to Young (1995), the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development’s (DIAND's) Indian Community Human 
Resources Strategies Program (ICHRS) in Canada, moved away from past program emphasis 
of loans/grants for individual business promotion, to those in human resource development 
and community-based businesses. From 1975 onward, Australia’s Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs began providing economic support for communal lands acquired under the ALFC 
(p. 107). At the same time, the nationally run and risk-avoiding lending agency. 
Commonwealth Capital Fund, was decentralized and transferred to the regionally-applied 
Aboriginal Loans Commission -  considered to be more sympathetic to the concerns of local 
people (p. 108).
The advent of international popular concern for sustainable development in the late 
1980s introduced further institutional changes to the emerging regime. As touched on in the 
first chapter, the latest thinking in international development theories which supported more 
communal and culturally-specific activities proved highly influential in government 
approaches to economic development programs targeted to Indigenous People. Theories of 
Community Economic Development (CED) that included aspects of Aboriginal Economic 
Development (AED) were increasingly incorporated into government programming. 
Introduced in 1989, the Canadian Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy (CAEDS) 
combined the efforts of three separate ministries to provide major program focus on human 
resource development, CED and efforts to derive more benefits from traditionally-used 
resources such as fisheries. CAEDS also provided funding support and business advice for 
procuring joint ventures with non-aboriginal partners and for fledgling Native Capital
Corporations established in 1984 (Elias, 1991).
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According to Young (1995), Australia’s Department of Aboriginal Affairs amalgamated with 
the small-scale business-focused funding arm Aboriginal Development Commission in the 
late 1980s to form the national Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission (ATSIC). 
With lending assistance for culturally appropriate businesses through the Community 
Economic Initiatives Scheme (CEIS), social benefits channeled through Community 
Employment Projects and Regional and Community Planning programs, the ATSIC involved 
the empowering, decision-making institution of regionally elected Aboriginal Commissioners 
(p. 107).
According to Te Manau Ngaherehere (1995), mid-1980 advances in New Zealand 
land leasing arrangements advocated by Maori land owners, the Maori Affairs Department 
and Board of Maori Affairs, created institutions conducive to Maori forestry. Examples of 
these institutions include 'amalgamated' Maori land leases, such as the Ngati Hine Lease, and 
Maori Trust-operated corporations, such as Taitokerau Forests Ltd., are examples of such 
institutions. These institutions provided Maori owners with annual rents, an annual 
percentage of stumpage on short-rotation plantations (approx. 35 years), stand-tending 
employment opportunities and the flexibility to use lands for other Maori purposes in the 
future (Te Manau Ngaherehere, 1995, p. 10). In the very important agriculture sector, the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) invoked a number of settlement negotiations resulting from 
investigations into discriminatory and sometimes fraudulent treaty allocations of poorly 
productive lands to Maori Iwi (tribal authorities) (Te Puni Kokiri, 1999).
Despite the positive changes made with respect to access to lands and resources for
Indigenous People, as well as, government economic development programs throughout the
1980s, widespread opportunities for all Indigenous People remained elusive. Much of lands
and resources transferred to Indigenous People have largely been restricted to relatively small
areas under treaties or other agreements. For example, the percentage of lands controlled or
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owned by Indigenous People in Australia and New Zealand consisted of only 13% in 1991 
and approximately 6% in 1996, respectively (Young, 1995, p.61; Te Puni Kokiri, 1998a). 
Furthermore, much of the land, trust and leasing allocations to Indigenous People are of 
marginal economic value. Seventy-nine percent of Maori land is classed as unsuitable for 
agriculture, pasture or forestry (Te Puni Kokiri, 1998b). While in Canada and Australia, the 
majority of land settlement allocations are located in the cold and rocky northern regions and 
parched scmblands of the Northern Territories, respectively.
Although progressively improving, government economic development programming 
generally lacked the incorporation of major CED/AED principals and suffered from an overt 
focus on market-based economic viability. According to Elias (1991) and Young (1995), 
major components in Canada’s CAEDS and Australia’s ATSIC programs were geared toward 
business development loans. Frequent changes in government administrations and the status 
of Indigenous legal rights in combination with emerging popular conceptions of sustainable 
development often led to discontinuities in economic development funding, programs and 
training (Elias, 1991;Young, 1995; Duffy and Stubben, 1998; Frideres, 1998). Even in the 
more progressive co-management schemes with governments, which were included in the 
‘modem treaties’ of the NWT, and shared-management conservation areas in New Zealand, 
Indigenous People rarely have equity in decision making authority (Berkes, 1994; Campbell, 
1996; Prystupa, 1998).
Indigenous People-Industry-Government Policy Regimes
In the 1990s, a series of compelling legal determinations with respect to Indigenous
rights and interests in public lands resulted in an intersection of govemment-industry and
Indigenous-govemment policy regimes. In Australia, the High Court Decisions Mabo 2
(1992) and Wik (1996), rejected the Terra Nullius - ‘Land belonging to no one’ - argument
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which asserts that upon discovery, public lands were immediately under the authority of the 
Crown (Kauffman, 1998). The decision gave common law recognition to the rights and 
interests of the Koori, known as ‘Native title’, over public lands and some pastoral leases. 
However, in the event of exigency, ‘Native title’ can be extinguished; but only through 
established legislative procedure and due compensation (Kauffman, 1998). In Canada, the 
legal decisions of Guerin (1984), Sparrow (1990) and especially Delgamuukw (1997) 
reaffirmed First Nation rights to lands and traditional use (Elias, 1991). Although placing the 
burden on First Nations to prove occupancy and traditional use for fee simple ownership, 
Delgamuukw (1997) affirmed the existence of (as yet) undefined First Nation rights with 
respect to traditional uses of public lands and resources; which are not necessarily pre- 
Contact in nature (Ibid., 1991; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997)). In New Zealand, 
three important legal determinations; Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley 
Authority (1987) and NZ Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1987) & (1990) established 
that the Treaty of Waitangi was binding on legislated acts regardless of whether or not it is 
specifically referred to in legal documents (Durie, 1998). In all case countries discussed here, 
recent litigation efforts by Indigenous People have acted to further reduce the certainty of 
government authority over lands and resources. Essentially, the legal ramifications are such 
that now many public lands are potentially open to claims by Indigenous People regardless if 
they live on the land in question, in a city or even outside the country.
Actors
The recent litigation efforts marked the beginning of a merging of Indigenous and
natural resources policy regimes. As a result, significant changes to the composition of
regime actors began to take place. Since national government assertions of sovereignty over
lands and resources are contested by recent litigation, their involvement in the policy regimes
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dramatically increased. In Canada, the federal government placed more funds and efforts 
into already established federal/provincial and territorial interim-measures boards that are 
designed to address Indigenous land and resource-use concerns during on-going treaty 
negotiations. Litigation spurred nationally-binding federal legislation such as the Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act (1993) for Maori land reform in New Zealand and Australia’s Native 
Title Amendment Act (1997) which affirmed the Koori right to make claim to public lands 
and pastoral leases under the Native Titles Act (1993) (Durie, 1998; Kaufmann, 1998).
The role of Indigenous People in the policy regime increased not only because of a 
greater level of political negotiation with governments and private industry, but more so 
because courts were increasingly making favorable determinations with respect to Indigenous 
protests of status quo economic developments. Further, aware of past examples of deficient 
joint ventures and economic development programs. Indigenous People are actively pursuing 
agreements with a broader ranger of benefits that include training, education, and shared 
management (NITA, 1995).
Industry’s role as regime actor moved away from an emphasis on a strong relationship 
with governments to one more inclusive of Indigenous People. The successful First Nation 
court injunction against logging activities on Mears Island, B.C. in 1989 and the ability for 
Koori to block mining and exploration through the Native Title Act (1993), convinced 
Industry that until Indigenous claims were settled, governments could not guarantee secure 
tenure (Cradock, 1998; ATSIC, 1999). Nonetheless, since governments remain important 
actors in economic development, the emerging policy regime involves a strong triad between 
governments. Indigenous People and Industry.
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Ideas
The developments of the 1990s served to build upon established ideas and introduced 
new ones. As touched on in the chapter on CED/AED, ideas surrounding government 
programming evolved to include more emphasis on cultural activities, training, self- 
govemance and co-management. However, it meant that commonly held ideas, such as 
‘terra nullius’, which served as a basis for sovereignty assertions, necessarily had to change. 
As it is now clear that legal aboriginal title exists, many of the newly emerging ideas deal 
with adapting such title into the fabric of society.
One of the most enduring of ideas with respect to lands, resources and government 
programming is that of partnerships between stakeholders. It is now widely recognized that 
the existence of aboriginal title affects not only Indigenous People and government but all 
members of national societies. Two ‘partnership’ ideas which have received much policy 
attention are political partnerships between national, regional and Indigenous governments 
and private sector partnerships (INAC, 1997; ATSIC, 1999; Te Puni Kokiri, 1999). Despite 
the commitment governments have placed on political partnerships with respect to 
Indigenous People, much more resources and effort have been directed to partnerships with 
the private sector. In all three countries, the bulk of budgeting for government programs 
targeting economic development for Indigenous People is directed to private sector- 
indigenous partnerships -  mostly in the form of wage subsidies for employment and training 
and business loans (ATSIC, 1999; INAC, 1999; Te Puni Kokiri, 1999). In New Zealand, the 
share of Active Labour Market Policy total expenditures devoted to private sector 
employment-generating schemes increased from 5% in 1985 to 14% in 1996 (Te Puni Kokiri, 
1999, p.lOO).
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A statement made in ATSIC’s on-line 1997-1998 Annual Report (1998) neatly captures the
idea of partnerships in all the case countries:
"... [government] initiatives have been driven by the desire to improve service 
delivery; harness skills and resources of other organizations -  and in particular 
the private sector; and more effectively link all activities aiming at promoting 
indigenous economic development.”
Institutions
In all case countries, institutions have increasingly developed to expedite private 
sector partnerships with Indigenous People in areas of land/resources and government 
economic development programming. With the enactment of the Native Title Amendment 
Act (1998), the national government of Australia introduced a series of land use agreement 
frameworks under the Native Title Act (1993) which specifically reduce bureaucratic 
restrictions for negotiations between Indigenous People and the private sector, yet ensure that 
Indigenous People are properly represented and native title not unduly extinguished (van 
Hattem, 1999).
Under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act (1993), the New Zealand government
continues to support and improve consolidation of small-sized and highly dispersed Maori-
owned lands by utilizing various kinds of Maori trusts and incorporations (Harris, 1997).
Especially for pastoral and forestry activities, consolidation of Maori lands increase their
economic viability and attractiveness to outside investors. Furthermore, in 1996 the New
Zealand government opened negotiations to allow the option of joint ventures between Maori
and outside forestry interests to buy out government leases on around 50,000 ha of Maori
lands stocked with high-value forest plantations (New Zealand Forestry, 1996, p.5).
Outside of direct treaty and land settlement proceedings, governments have developed
a number of institutions to improve Indigenous access or control over access to natural
resources on public lands. In Canada, federal, provincial and territorial governments began
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contributing more resources and effort to previously established ‘interim measures’ programs 
that address First Nation interests in lands and resources while lengthy treaty settlement 
negotiations continue. Interim measures moved away from strictly monetary transfers to 
include innovative arrangements that provide First Nations with access to raw materials (i.e. 
short-term forest licenses) that can support economic development (MOF, 1998; IN AC,
1999). Newly refined interim agreement boards, such as the Canada-Saskatchewan 
Common Table, serve to provide a forum where private industry. Indigenous People and 
government can investigate appropriate economic activities i.e. joint ventures (INAC, 1999). 
According to Te Tari Kooti (1999), New Zealand’s Resource Management Act (1993) was 
amended in 1996 to establish the non-legal Environment Court mandated to air concerns over 
access to land for development purposes. In addition to serving as a dispute mechanism, the 
Environment Court also functions to provide information and clarification to private industry 
and Maori on such matters as government policy positions and declarations on legal status of 
activities.
In New Zealand and Canadian ‘modem’ treaty settlements, a number of government-
indigenous institutions were recently introduced to promote innovative private partnerships
that not only produce economic wealth, but also protect Indigenous interests. In the recent
Nisga’a Treaty (1999) in BC, an innovative forest tenure agreement allows the Nisga’a First
Nation to manage extensive tracts of Crown forest land and collect stumpage from private
forest companies on behalf of the Nisga’a and the Crown. In New Zealand, joint ventures
have been applied in treaty settlements to widely distribute capital, access to resources, and
economic capacity-building benefits to Maori. In the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim)
Settlement (1992), fishing quota and proceeds related to the Maori-industry joint venture,
Sealord Products Ltd., went not only to Maori claimants of traditional fishing areas, but also
to inland and urban Maori groups (Durie, 1998, p.158-159). The Maori venture partner of
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Sealord, Te Ohu Kaimoana, promoted Maori economic development and education in 
fisheries through targeted education programs, scholarships and fishing quota leasing 
arrangements (Durie, 1998).
A number of specific policy institutions have emerged or are emerging to assist the 
development of and/or delivery of economic development programming through private 
sector partnerships and joint ventures. In 1997, ATSIC began negotiations with private banks 
to deliver the business training program. Getting on With Business (ATSIC, 1998). While in 
New Zealand, greater levels of funding have been channeled to private sector organizations 
for on-the-job and class-based training in transferable-industry skills through the Industry 
Training Strategy (Skills New Zealand, 1999). In Canada, treaty Interim Measures 
institutions provide fora for First Nations, governments and Industry to explore joint venture 
opportunities and to develop and apply innovative training (MAA, 1996; INAC, 1999).
Conclusion
In the three countries examined there is a clear trend of increasing cooperative 
relationships between Indigenous People and the private sector in policy regimes surrounding 
economic development programming and utilization of natural resources on public land. In 
the late 1980s, advances in environmental legislation and policy that stemmed from the 
World Commission on Economic Development principals of sustainable development, 
required that the interests of Indigenous People be addressed before development proceeded. 
Legal clarification of Indigenous rights in the 1990s served to entrench the existence of 
Indigenous rights to public lands and use of resources in a modem context. In response to the 
legal changes, both industry and governments increasingly entered into partnerships with 
Indigenous People that are characterized by elements of cooperative shared management and 
capacity building.
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Forestry Joint Ventures in British Columbia
Until this point the focus on policy regimes has been within a national context. 
However, the case of forestry joint ventures in BC occurs within a more localized context 
where provincial and local actors command a greater deal of influence. Thus, this section sets 
out to draw parallels between arguments suggesting the emergence of new policy regimes at a 
national level with the case of policy regimes surrounding forestry and economic 
development of First Nations in BC and the north central region. The historical progression 
of BC’s forest industry and related First Nation involvement is outlined to illustrate a shift in 
forest-sector related government policies which increasingly involved private sector 
partnerships with First Nations.
The First Nations of the north central interior region of British Columbia belong to a 
broad ethnic group known as Athapaskans who have inhabited the areas of the Chilcotin 
Basin for thousands of years (Duff, 1969). Distinguished by cultural, linguistic and 
geographic characteristics, Athapaskan tribes in the north central region belonged to three 
broad nations; Carrier, Sekani and Chilcotin. With the advent of national control by the 
federal government and later the BC government in the late 1800s, the First Nations were 
reorganized for government administration purposes. Now, three tribal councils -  Carrier- 
Sekani, Carrier-Chilcotin, and Cariboo - and two independent bands -  Lheit-Lit’en Nation 
and Lake Babine Band -  represent the majority of First Nations’ communities in the north 
central region under this study.
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Forestry is of major economic significance to the economies of BC and Canada. 
Around seventy percent of Canada’s total exports in sawn timber originate from BC. In 1997, 
the wood products industry in BC contributed to about 48 percent, or $16.8 billion, of total 
Canadian manufactured shipments (COFl, 1998, p.3.3).
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the bulk of forest operations were carried out 
on Vancouver Island and the coastal areas. Advances in small wood sawmilling technology 
and the emerging pulp and paper sector in the early 1970s prompted a dramatic expansion of 
large-scale forestry activities in the interior regions of BC. Currently, the production of 
dimensional lumber, and pulp and paper by large integrated forest companies make up a 
majority of northern BC forest product outputs destined for the United States, Canadian and 
overseas markets. More than 40% of BC’s total softwood lumber output is produced in this 
region (NFPA(B.C.), 1998, p.l).
The majority of forest land in northern BC is publicly owned with around 80% 
managed in large, long-term timber tenures by relatively few integrated companies. The 
remaining 20% is either private or managed by the government to meet social and economic 
objectives such as promoting small business, value-added industries and woodlot 
establishment (NFPA(B.C.), 1998, p.l).
First Nations have a long history of involvement in BC’s forest sector. As Knight 
(1996) points out, throughout the 1800s and early 1900s First Nations were employed in a 
variety of activities including band-owned hand-logging companies and small sawmills. 
However, participation of First Nations steadily declined as the forest industry progressed 
from a focus on numerous timber extraction and basic saw milling operations to integrated 
land management by large companies involved in high volume production of a variety of 
forest products (BCGov't, 1991). Currently, 80% of First Nation communities are located on
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forest lands, yet First Nations only make up about 2% of the labour force in the forest 
products industry (NAPA, 1997, p.2).
A number of characteristics of the forest sector evolution are attributed to reduced 
First Nation participation. Increasingly, available forestry employment moved from 
localized, outdoor-oriented activities to full-time, centralized manufacturing-type jobs. 
Manufacturing employment may have been less appealing to First Nations, in general, 
considering work schedules reflected European-inspired standards such as the working week 
and holidays as opposed to First Nation conceptions such as working periods and seasonal- 
based breaks for hunts and other traditional activities. First Nation involvement in emerging 
capital - and technology-intensive manufacturing activities was increasingly out of reach as a 
large portion of community members lacked sufficient skills, education, and capital. This can 
be largely attributed to BC Government resistance to acknowledging First Nation rights to 
productive lands and resources. Unlike other areas of Canada during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, BC First Nations never signed treaties with governments. Only 
relatively small tracts of marginal land were reserved and managed for First Nations by the 
federal government. Subsequent efforts by First Nation advocates to gain further recognition 
of rights were actively blocked by BC’s Government until the early 1970s when a legal case 
put forward by the Nisga’a resulted in a landmark Supreme Court decision Colder (1973) 
(NFB , 1991).
As a result of First Nation inspired litigation, the BC Provincial Government finally
committed to participate in the negotiation of ‘modem’ treaties with First Nations in 1991.
Yet, despite the new economic opportunities that treaty negotiations would open, the ability
for BC First Nations to widely participate in co-management of natural resources and
lucrative forestry and mining activities on public lands, remained elusive. The federal and
BC governments continued to take the stance that transfer of fee simple title and/or sovereign
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status to very large claimed territories was not possible. Through negotiation, legally 
established but largely undefined traditional-use rights over claimed territories were to be 
exchanged for fee simple title to relatively small areas of land, some co-management 
responsibilities, cash payments, and/or government concessions (INAC, 1996). Particularly 
contentious treaty issues surrounding resource use were that governments viewed traditional 
rights as only those related to traditional activities that were carried out prior to European 
contact. However, court cases such as Guerin (1984), Sparrow (1990) and the recent 
Delgamuukw (1997) have all re-affirmed First Nation rights in relation to modem resource 
uses such as timber harvesting.
First Nations in BC are keenly interested in forestry and forest manufacturing 
opportunities. Out of a total of 196 First Nations (Bands) in BC, 160 have stated interest in 
pursuing forestry as an economic development strategy (COFl, 1994, p29). Further, First 
Nations see forestry joint ventures as an important means to build member and organizational 
capacities to participate in the global economy (NITA, 1995; Cradock, 1998; Assembly of 
First Nations, 2000)
With respect to economic development, federal and BC government responses to 
advances in First Nation rights to lands and resources have been to modify programs and 
policies to improve the opportunities for, and First Nation capacities for, involvement in co­
managed, forest-based economic development (BCGovt., 1991). The current Federal 
Government’s program Gathering Strength, includes programs to develop First Nation 
capacities in fiscal administration (Fiscal Relations Program) and natural resource 
management (Land Management Training Program) (INAC, 1999, p.25-26). INAC’s recent 
First Nations Forestry Program (FNFP) initiative earmarked nearly one million dollars in 
1998 to forest business capacity building in such projects as forestry skills training, forest
management plan development and business feasibility studies (INAC, 1997).
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In BC, ‘interim measures’ carried out by all BC Government ministries provide 
support for such things as First Nations access to natural resources and management training 
with respect to lands and resources subject to on-going treaty negotiations (MOF, 1998).
Both federal and BC governments have placed much emphasis on forestry joint 
ventures. According to Nello Cataldo of the First Nations Forestry Program, “A major aim of 
the program is to encourage joint ventures with off-reserve business partners. The program 
supports activities that identify, encourage and develop partnership initiatives, negotiation, 
business and forest management skills”(INAC, 1997, p .l)
Recent political willingness to negotiate treaties and concessions make up key aspects 
of the BC government's role in stimulating industrial partnerships. Of particular importance 
is provision of access to timber supplies. Incentives created by government policy, and 
access to timber supply through the MOF Small Business Forest Enterprise Program’s 
Section 21 Sales greatly encourage Industry and First Nations to collaborate on new 
economic opportunities. Of special interest to First Nations involved in treaty negotiations is 
that use-rights under Section 21 Sales (and other MOF tenures) only apply to the timber and 
not underlying land title; thus, a third party cannot claim title or property rights to areas under 
joint venture activities.
The most common forms of formal forestry ventures in north central BC revolve 
around re-manufacturing and related service contract operations. For the purposes of this 
study re-manufacturing refers to any activity that adds value beyond primary dimensional 
lumber manufacture, and ranges from resawing of lumber to more value-added finished 
products such as finger-joined lumber, log homes, wooden 1-joists, structural frames, 
moldings and window-frames. Service contract operations refer to a variety of contract 
companies involved in such things as logging, hauling, maintenance, and so on.
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The ubiquitous use of terms such as partnerships and joint ventures in literature, and 
the rhetoric surrounding collaborative industrial ventures has made it difficult to clearly 
define what is meant by the term joint venture. Typical business relationships in industrial 
forestry partnerships in north central BC are ad hoc, legal partnerships, limited partnerships, 
joint ventures, and incorporations. Often industrial relationships referred to as joint ventures 
are not Joint Operating Agreement-type ventures (see Chapter one), but rather some other 
form of business relationship or collaborative economic arrangement. In fact, most of the 
First Nations and forest companies I approached during this study were involved in ad hoc 
collaborations.
A legal agreement that defines a relationship is a critical framework which partners 
refer to for guidance during operations and unforeseen circumstances. As venture outcomes 
are highly dependent on business relationships, clear understanding is needed of respective 
co-venturer rights and responsibilities. Various legal business relationships applicable to BC 
forestry ventures are described in Appendix 1.
In summary, the policy regime in the BC forest sector has changed from one with an 
emphasis on the relationship between large forest industry and government that resulted in 
the marginalization of First Nation participation in forestry, to a policy regime more inclusive 
of First Nations. With on-going legal clarification of First Nation rights, the BC government 
has moved to promote Industry-First Nation partnerships by making available timber supply 
for secondary wood products manufacture.
The emergence of a policy regime characterized by the triad of industry, government 
and First Nations in BC is congruent with the emergence of similar regimes discussed earlier 
in this chapter’s examination of national government policy regimes in Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia. The fact that similar policy regimes have emerged in the BC forest sector, as
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well as across differing national jurisdictions, suggests that the emergence of similar regimes 
in an international context is very possible. For international practitioners who may find 
themselves considering Indigenous-Industry joint venture activities, a study of the positive 
and negative aspects of BC First Nation-Industry joint ventures can provide important lessons 
about how future ventures should be approached.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
This thesis sets out to explore how joint ventures with Indigenous People contribute to 
capacity building according to concepts of AED. Specifically, the study examines whether 
adhering to principles of AED/CED outlined in Chapter One helps joint ventures contribute 
to capacity building.
Scope
For a number of reasons, the geographic scope of the field research focuses on north 
central British Columbia. First, the First Nations political economy of BC - a mixture of 
legally recognized but largely undefined First Nation rights, modem treaty negotiations and 
government incentives - has created an environment more conducive to the wide-spread 
formation of industrial partnerships with the forest industry than in any other region in 
Canada (Cradock, 1998). Focusing on the north central region allowed me to visit First 
Nations’ communities and meet face-to-face with their representatives.
The study area ranges from Williams Lake in the south to Ft. St. James in the north. 
The communities of Moricetown and Prince George mark the west and east boundaries of the 
study area. Relatively uniform forest resources and weather conditions characterize the study 
area. Industries within these areas face similar market conditions as all are located a 
considerable distance from major urban industrial cores and end-markets.
In general, the nature of both industrial partnerships themselves and economic 
development in First Nation communities precludes a purely deductive examination of the 
presence or absence of capacity building components (Merriam, 1988). Joint ventures are 
highly diverse institutions whose organizational behavior depends on a host of circumstances. 
Nature and marketability of products produced, size and influence of industrial co-venturers
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and training requirements of First Nation employees all vary according to such things as 
negotiated terms of agreement, on-going relationships between venture partners and product 
demand. Even if functionally identical ventures (same products produced under the same 
JO As with employees of the same community) were to be studied, diversity of such things as 
individual employee/manager characteristics and market forces suggests that factors could 
not be analyzed without interpretation according to context.
Similarly, economic development in many First Nation communities does not follow 
linear concepts according to conventional economic growth models espoused in popularly 
practiced development theory (modernization). As experience has shown, in international 
and national development approaches - carried out under conventional paradigms such as 
modernization - attempts to stimulate economic wealth in communities with differing world 
views and conditions of underdevelopment does not achieve the expected savings and 
investment behavior assumed in a western economic growth model (Todaro, 1994). The fact 
that national governments and development agencies have widely adopted CED and other 
alternative theoretical approaches grounded in international development theory, suggests an 
implicit acknowledgement of the nonlinear dimension of economic development in 
Indigenous and local communities.
Aside from inherent complexity of economic development issues, ventures in BC
operate within unique political and strategic business contexts that limit how candidly First
Nation and Industry representatives will provide information. Thus, the use and comparison
of ‘objective’ factors obtained through experimental means such as survey questionnaires
with pre-defined questions will likely not reveal the full dimension of the joint venture
phenomenon (Yin, 1994). Further, considering the extensive history of government attempts
to assimilate First Nations, and recent concerns over exploitation of Indigenous
knowledge/products, First Nations generally have been resistant to providing socioeconomic
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data on their communities. Having experienced a dramatic increase in non-aboriginal 
contractors and businesses interested in First Nation information, communities are especially 
wary about information they share concerning their joint ventures (Chief Martine Louie, pers. 
comm., June, 1998).
A major factor limiting a more quantitative approach is that specific details 
concerning ventures are private, as the JOA is a confidential, legal document. All venture 
partners approached in this study immediately made it clear that as they are operating in a 
competitive market environment, the JOA document must remain confidential. However, 
with respect to First Nation participation and capacity-building, research participants were 
generally open to discussing and revealing related documentation which illustrated 
progressive features of their JO As.
In short, the study is not aimed at only finding out how many ventures use JOAs or 
incorporate central tenets of AED/CED. Rather, the intent is to provide insight into how 
AED/CED principles are integrated into ventures and the overall impact ventures have with 
respect to meeting community-specific goals for AED. Although ventures may exhibit all 
major characteristics consistent with an AED approach, such as First Nation management 
participation on BODs and equity ownership, the manner of their application may limit 
overall effectiveness. For example, there is a big difference between how much First Nation 
business acumen is developed through management collaboration on a Board - whose scope 
is restricted largely to broad investment decisions and courses of action - and management 
collaboration in day-to-day operational matters.
Given the complexity of joint venture variables and the thesis questions posed, which 
seek to find out how and why joint ventures are addressing capacity building as defined by 
AED, a case study research design is utilized. According to Yin (1994), the case study
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approach is appropriate in situations where questions of how and why are raised in a context 
in which the researcher has little control over behavioral events (p.6).
Case study research is characterized by the dominant role a researcher plays in 
gathering and analyzing data. The researcher makes sense of a complex of issues by 
employing inductive reasoning to interpret factors disclosed through descriptive researching 
of case example data; which may be obtained through a variety of means including 
documentation, stakeholder interviews, and observation (Merriam, 1988). Researcher 
interpretation can help provide insight or expose causal relationships by contextually relating 
on-the-ground activities to broad theoretical constructs or ‘grounding’ theory (Ibid., 1988). 
Rather than examining cases with a rigid, pre-defined framework solely based on theory or 
historical accounts, the researcher allows information and experiences of the fieldwork 
process to improve evaluative tools, which provides better understanding about the subject 
(Yin, 1994). In fact, my initial evaluative framework - based only on business-related 
literature surrounding TVs and readings in mainstream AED literature - did not fully focus on 
important components of local First Nation conceptions of AED. Upon discovering, through 
the field research process, the importance of First Nation ownership and employment 
opportunities, I changed the evaluative framework to better reflect joint venture experiences.
Two points of major concern are how researcher ethics and subjectivity affect the
objective results of the study. The role of the researcher brings up issues concerning the
limitations of the case study approach. It is asserted that facts and figures can be interpreted
by a researcher to produce results according to preconceived notions or strongly-held beliefs
(Merriam, 1988). I have made an attempt in this research to mitigate overtly biased results by
utilizing proven case study methodology, informing interview participants of my role as a
researcher and providing the reader of this thesis with an indication of my biases
(Creswell,1994). By stating my biases here the reader can be aware of the possible impacts
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my bias may have had on this study. My experience is derived not only from an academic 
review of the issues but also from personally working and living in rural forest Industry and 
Indigenous communities in northern Saskatchewan, British Columbia, the NorthWest 
Territories, and Chiapas, Mexico. Self-determined economic development was a topic of 
central concern in all local communities I worked with. I am not a First Nation member nor 
attest to know the experiences of First Nation people, but I am convinced that joint ventures 
represent an opportunity to advance self-sufficient and sustained economic development. In 
order for joint venture relationships to achieve this, both First Nation and non-aboriginal 
partners must be prepared to leam from research outcomes.
By following accepted case study methodology with respect to sampling and analysis 
of data, concerns over objectivity of results due to a researcher’s inherent subjectivity can be 
mitigated. As detailed below, triangulated information obtained from purposively sampled 
interview respondents; personal communications; background literature; and joint venture 
proposal documents make up the foundation of this research.
Data Collection
Data collection methodology for a case study allows for multiple techniques ranging 
from literature and document review to field research with personal interviews, in order to 
fully explore the thesis topic (Yin, 1994). In this study, information used for examining the 
case studies was obtained from a number of sources: personal interviews, partnership 
proposal documents, and available literature on AED/CED. The triangulation method is 
employed to ensure the validity of the research data collected through the various techniques. 
Triangulation refers to a process where a specific piece of information is cross-checked with 
related data collected through other techniques or different informants/information sources 
within a technique (Creswell, 1994).
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Sampling
Given the complex and variable nature of joint ventures, the unknown number of 
industrial partnerships, and the relatively few Industry-Indigenous ventures in BC that are 
organized around a legal JOA, ‘purposive’ case sampling, based on opportunity and 
researcher limitations, was employed to find the best representative cases. Purposive or 
subjective sampling is when specific samples best suited to the purposes of the study are 
selected either through the use of researcher criteria or by the recommendations of 
knowledgeable contacts. Purposive sampling in qualitative research is considered an 
acceptable technique when a sample population cannot be precisely defined (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). Ventures sought were those that formally involved 
capacity-building elements characteristic of a model joint venture: a JOA-type legal 
agreement. Indigenous management participation, transfer of process techniques and 
technology, and cultural considerations (including on-the job, formal and advanced training 
opportunities, as well as measures of corporate goodwill).
A majority of the region’s dominant forest companies were polled by phone and 
office visits to inquire about joint ventures with First Nations. From initial contacts, further 
contacts were recommended with persons and organizations such as First Nation 
Development Corporations, Tribal Council representatives, and First Nation businesses.
Personal Interviews
A total of 26 structured interviews were carried out with key stakeholder informants 
that included representatives from Industry, Ministry of Forests, and First Nation economic 
organizations and Band governments. Interviewees were chosen because of their expertise, 
willingness to participate and relative accessibility. The majority of interviews took place
within the informants’ community or place of business.
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The interview guide (Appendix 2) consisted of a series of open-ended questions 
related to major capacity-building themes outlined in AED literature and best-practices case 
studies. Questions were sufficiently open-ended as to allow for previously unconsidered 
factors to be identified. Having developed good interviewing skills within a concurrently run 
research project, I employed hand recorded interviewing techniques as opposed to audio 
recording. To ensure that the interview guide both appropriately phrased questions and, more 
importantly, provided information necessary to address the study topic, an interview pretest 
(Yin, 1994) was carried out with a representative from the Lake Babine Nation in Bums 
Lake.
Documents
Key documents referred to in the case study evaluations were proposal applications 
for Ministry of Forests Small Business Forest Enterprise Program timber tenures that outlined 
timber supply needs and partnership arrangements. Although varying considerably in content 
and language, proposals included First Nation objectives for employment levels; 
partnerships; partner commitments; management roles; and facilitation efforts. Informants 
suggested that concepts described in proposals are consistent with elements of confidential 
JOAs. In fact, in a JOA I was able to view, details were consistent with information found in 
the related public proposal document.
Evaluation of proposal documents involved checking to see how well they adhered to 
the spirit and intent of AED principals covered in Chapter I. By comparing what was set out 
in proposal documents with actual outcomes, one can also check whether or not adherence to 
principals of AED may have contributed to relative joint venture success or lack of success.
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Chapter Four
Joint Venture Case Examples
The examination of case studies in this chapter illustrates how joint ventures in value- 
added wood products manufacture between First Nation and Industry, address capacity 
building of First Nation members and communities. First, selected joint venture cases are 
separately evaluated and summarized according to criteria previously discussed in Chapter 
One of this thesis;
0 Maximized First Nation employment levels 
0 First Nation ownership 
0 First Nation participation in management 
0 Advanced training and education opportunities 
0 Support of community and cultural activities
Then, the outcomes of all case evaluations are examined together within the context 
of each capacity-building theme (i.e. management participation). Results are then discussed 
in terms of limitations, implications and conclusions.
As discussed in the methodology chapter, I interviewed a number of First Nation and 
forest businesses in order to come up with appropriate joint ventures cases to examine. Out 
of eleven prospective First Nation-Industry collaborations I contacted, only four ventures had 
formal organizational structures approaching a JOA-type agreement (Table 1). Thus, for the 
case study examinations I examined the following ventures: Kyahwood Forest Products, 
Bums Lake Specialty Wood Products , Dezti Forest Products and Tl’oh Forest Products.
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Table 1. Northern BC First Nations-Industry Economie Partnerships Considered for 
Case Study Examination
First Nation Industrial Partner Location Venture Type Case
Use?
Reasons
Ft. Babine Band Pacific Inland 
Resources
Ft. Babine Silviculture
contracts
no No formal venture
Moricetown Northwood Moricetown Fingerjoined yes Joint venture
Band lumber
Cheslatta Canadian Forest Southbank Submerged no Not functioning
Carrier Nation Products Logging
Bums Lake Babine Forest Burns Lake Fingerjoined yes Long running
Native Products (Weldwood) lumber and venture
Development housing
Corp. components
Ne Duchun Vanderhoof Specialty Vanderhoof Fingerjoint yes Limited partnership
Forest Products Woods/ Slocan lumber, housing
Ltd. Group components
Nak’azdli Band Apollo Forest 
Products
Ft. St. James Fingerjoined 
lumber, I-joists
yes Limited Partnership
Lheit-Lit’en Lakeland, Carrier Prince George Shingles, no Not continuously
Nation Lumber and 
Northwood
silviculture
contracts
operating
Nazko Band Slocan Group Quesnel Lumber mill 
Silviculture
no non-JOA structure
Lhatako Dene Tolko Quesnel contracts. no no formal venture
Nation management
assistance
Soda Creek Weldwood Soda Creek Log Homes no Owned by Pioneer
Indian Band
Lumber mill.
Log Homes
Williams Lake West Fraser and Williams Lake management no Not operating
Band Lignum assistance
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Case Evaluations 
Burns Lake Specialty Wood
Burns Lake Native Development Corporation/Babine Forest Products Ltd.
This case study is based on information obtained through BSW’s TSL proposal 
(360514 B.C. Ltd.(BSW), 1989) and 1998 interviews with Mr. Patrick Kohlo, General 
Manager, Bums Lake Native Development Corporation; Mr. Wes Boehmer, Manager, Bums 
Lake Native Logging; Mr. Frank Michelle, Lake Babine Band; Chief Robert Charlie, Bums 
Lake Band; Barry Metzner, General Manager, BSW; Rod Beaumont, Chief Forester, 
Weldwood of Canada Ltd., Vancouver.
The history of First Nation collaboration between Weldwood of Canada’s Babine 
Forest Products (Babine) and First Nations of the Bums Lake area began in 1974 following 
an award of a 1.2 million cubic metre TSL. The collaboration resulted in the establishment 
of a First Nation-owned development corporation called the Bums Lake Native Development 
Corporation (BLNDC), and a logging company. Bums Lake Native Logging (BLNL).
BLNDC was established by BC/federal governments and a consortium of local First 
Nations - Broman Lake Band, Bums Lake Band, Cheslatta, Lake Babine Nation and Nee- 
Tahi-Buhn - for the purpose of managing revolving investment funds and facilitating 
economic development. Babine is an integrated forestry company producing dimensional 
lumber for US and Canadian markets and is majority owned and managed by Weldwood of 
Canada with 58% of shares. West Fraser Timber Co. with 32% of shares and BLNDC with a 
10% stake (INAC, 1999). BLNL is one of three long-term logging contractors harvesting 
about 112,000 cubic metres of timber annually for Babine. In addition to harvesting, about 
10% of their work includes road building and rehabilitation.
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Started in 1992, Bums Lake Specialty Wood (BSW) is a specialty wood products mill 
co-owned by BLNDC at 50% (originally 40%) and Babine which produces housing 
components (i.e. floor joists and trusses) for Japanese and European markets (Figure 1).
Weldwood 58% West Fraser Timber 32%
7
Babine Forest Products Ltd (1974)
50%
Burns Lake 
Specialty 
Woods (1992)
First Nation Investors
Broman Lake Burns Lake Band 
Cheslatta Lake Babine Nation 
Nee-Tahi-Buhn
10%
Burns Lk. Native Development Corp. (1974)
100%
Bums Lake Native Logging Ltd. (1974)
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the Bums Lake Specialty Woods Joint Venture
Goals
One of BC’s first Indigenous-Industry manufacturing related collaborations, BSW’s 
only available public TSL proposal document is sketchy about goals related to First Nation 
participation and capacity-building (BSW, 1989). Aside from business viability, goals were 
to provide First Nation employment levels that correspond with population distributions in 
the community of Bums Lake and "...native equity participation with co-management 
responsibilities..."(BSW, 1989, p.3). According to Mr. Kohlo, manager of BLNDC, goals of
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First Nation stakeholders for BSW have focused on long-term objectives for ownership of 
operations. Both BLNDC and Bums Lake Native Logging have negotiated increases in 
harvesting quotas by 70% and in equity ownership in BSW from 40% to 50%. Additional 
goals identified by BLNDC and BLNL representatives included the need for transfer of 
technology and strategic management training. Mr. Beaumont, Chief Forester for Weldwood 
of Canada, also suggested a major goal for BSW and other Weldwood-First Nation 
collaborations is to ensure continued economic growth and mutual benefits within an 
emerging political environment where First Nations have substantial influence over lands and 
resources.
Results
Ownership
As mentioned, BLNDC realized ownership in the BSW industrial collaboration 
through 50% equity in BSW, 100% ownership in BLNL, and 10% in Babine. However, such 
ownership patterns have not met overall goals of BLNDC for a number of reasons. First, the 
First Nation development corporation had hoped to have a greater percentage of ownership in 
BSW. As stated by Mr. Kohlo, eventual full-ownership of the venture is an important goal 
for First Nations in the area. Until recently, efforts to increase both BLNDC ownership in 
BSW and BLNDC harvest levels have consistently been met with resistance by Babine and 
Weldwood.
Judging by the responses from members of the Babine Lake Nation, Bums Lake 
Band, BLNDC and BLNL, the Bums Lake Specialty Wood collaboration lacked a sense of 
community ownership. According to informants, negative perceptions can be attributed to a 
resistance by Babine to renegotiate the partnership agreement to reflect advances in
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recognition of First Nation rights. Also, unresolved differences between individual First 
Nations collaborating in BLNDC and BSW, created significant division amongst community 
members. Chief Robert Charlie of the Bums Lake Band strongly voiced his discontent with 
BSW as an investment for the Band. Furthermore, BSW provided poor capital returns to the 
Band and employed very few of their members. In fact, over the last six years, the involved 
Bands have received almost no dividends from initial investments in the millions of dollars 
(Boehmer, pers. comm., November, 1999). Finally, despite their capital contributions, the 
Bums Lake Band, as a minority First Nation in the community, had very little say with 
respect to operational matters in BSW or investment decisions made by BLNDC.
Management
BSW is an incorporated limited partnership, with Weldwood as the general managing 
partner. BSW is directed by a four member Board of Directors (BOD): three members from 
Babine and one from BLNDC. Although the Board arrangement allows for First Nation 
input into BSW, the level of representation is minimal. If a particularly contentious issue 
arises between Babine and BLNDC, a Board vote can be easily vetoed by the general partner. 
According to Mr. Kohlo, BLNDC representation should at least reflect their level of 
ownership in BSW. Management of BSW operations is carried out by Weldwood (Babine) 
through a designated manager. First Nation participation in management consists of one 
foreman and two administrative assistants.
Babine assumes the majority of responsibilities for managing forestry plans and 
obligations with respect to the BSW timber supply. In most cases. First Nation and other 
BLNL employees have minimal exposure to the techniques used in completing plans.
As asserted by Mr. Kohlo, there is concern that management may not be focusing on
viability and future growth of BSW. No significant changes were made to management
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approach and the substantial management fees charged despite recent poor performance of 
BSW. In Mr. Kohlo's opinion, Weldwood’s priorities for the BSW venture were more 
related to guaranteeing timber supply for Babine, than ensuring that BSW was a viable, 
growing business.
Management Style
Management of BSW is carried out according to a ’team’-approach that Weldwood 
applies to all its forestry operations. The team-approach sees members of various 
departments or production teams work together to achieve that particular work unit’s 
objectives. All employees operate in a working environment characterized by equality where 
advancement is based on merit. Some efforts have been made to provide limited job rotation. 
However, because employees are unionized, rigidly defined job classifications and seniority 
rules restrain the flexibility of a team approach.
Despite management efforts, tensions have developed between the First Nation and 
non-First Nation employees that stem from cultural differences and the fact that Status First 
Nation employees typically made more money (as their income is not taxed).
Training
Training in BSW includes scheduled and on-the-job training programs. At the 
beginning, and periodically throughout the history of BSW, governments and NGOs such as 
the Prince George Native Training Association have been involved in providing employment- 
entry and advanced skills training. BSW management, on the other hand, has provided on- 
the-job training, first aid/safety skills, and refresher courses for lumber graders, co-funded by 
Forest Renewal BC and HRD Canada. Two employees are currently apprenticing as 
electricians.
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Employment
As 35% of BSW’s 25 employees are First Nation, original proposal goals for a level 
of employment representative of First Nation populations in Bums Lake have been met. 
However, the current level still represents a reduction in First Nation employment, which at 
the beginning of BSW, was around 50%. As of 1998, respondents suggested that overall 
interest in providing employment equity to levels commonly attained in newer joint ventures 
is not a priority of Weldwood.
Cultural Support
First Nation interests are largely represented through BLNDC s participation on BSW 
and BFP Boards of Directors. However, some community members questioned the 
appropriateness of BLNDC as a provider of equitable representation for all participating First 
Nations. A First Nation’s voice and respective say in BLNDC’s activities largely depend on 
contribution levels and number of members. Thus, according to Chief Charlie of the Bums 
Lake Band, the agenda for economic development tends to be dominated by the interests of 
the area’s largest First Nation; the Lake Babine Nation.
Both BSW and BFP provide funds for community projects such as sponsoring sports 
teams and donating to local charities. However, such sponsorship is directed to the whole 
community of Bums Lake and not specifically to First Nation members.
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Recognition
Similar to other collaborative ventures, it was legally established that BSW would 
proceed without prejudice to First Nation treaty claims. Proposal documents provide no 
acknowledgement of possible First Nation jurisdiction.
Informal Relationship
In general, the relationship between Babine and partner First Nations in BSW is 
antagonistic. Weldwood’s initial resistance^ to altering original agreements to provide more 
opportunities and advancement for First Nation interests, has left an impression that the 
overall relationship is one sided and not geared towards mutual benefits. While Industry 
partners are finding the conflicting goals and objectives of the First Nation consortium 
partners difficult to manage.
 ^As of 1999, Weld wood is renegotiating the terms of BSW with BLNDC
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Tl’oh Forest Products Ltd.
Nak’azdli First Nation /Apollo Forest Products Ltd. - Fort St. James
Information gathered here is based on the Nak al koh’s Timber Sale Licence (TSL) 
proposal document (Nak’al koh Timber Ltd., 1994) and interviews carried out in 1998 with 
Mr. Merv Work, Operations Manager, TToh Forest Products Ltd. (Tl'oh); Mr. Scott Shettel, 
General Manager/Director, Tl'oh and Manager, Apollo; Chief Harold Prince, Nak’azdli; and 
Leonard Thomas, Carrier-Sekanni Tribal Council.
Tl'oh Forest Products is located on the Nak’ azdli Reserve, outside the town of Fort 
St. James. Approximately 150 km northwest of Prince George, the community of Fort St. 
James is located on the south end of Stuart Lake. Directly employing around 45% of the 
labour force. Ft. St. James’ main industries are in forestry and forest products manufacture 
(BCStats, 1996).
The MOF’s Ft. St. James Forest District administers approximately three million 
hectares of forest land consisting largely of pine/spruce forests. Major forest companies in the 
area are Canadian Forest Products and Apollo Forest Products. Established in 1969, Apollo 
Forest Products Ltd. (Apollo) is a modem, integrated forest products company specializing in 
stud manufacture, as well as the management and reforestation of its license area.
The Nak’azdli First Nation make up about one-third of the population of Ft. St. James 
and are members of the Carrier-Sekanni Tribal Council. The Nak’azdli Band Government 
(Nak’azdli) is the central representative of the Nak’azdli Nation in most pohtical and 
economic aspects.
After a lengthy period of negotiations, Apollo and the Nak’azdli collaborated to begin 
the Tl’oh venture in 1993 upon a successful bid proposal for the acquisition of a non- 
replaceable TSL and Forest License (FL) through the MOF’s SBFEP. As a result, a fully-
67
owned First Nation forest management company, Nak’al koh Timber Ltd. (Nak’al koh) and 
the jointly owned Tl’oh finger-joined stud and I-Joist mill (Apollo 50% - Nak’azdli 50%) 
were formed and located on the Nak’azdli Reserve near the town of Fort St. James. The 
Tl’oh mill remanufactures waste trim blocks from Apollo’s milling operations into value- 
added building components which are marketed both regionally and internationally. Nak’al 
koh is responsible for harvesting timber allotted under the TSL & FL, as well as, reforestation 
and forest management obligations tied to the FL. (See Figure 1). Nak’al koh employs 12 
First Nation members in their harvesting operation including four involved in forestry 
planning fieldwork. Tl'oh employs 60 people of which 85% are Nak’azdli members.
Goals
Nak’azdli’s goals for the partnership are based on long-standing concerns over 
providing long-term, local employment options for Nation members. In the early 1990s the 
Nak’ azdli community had an unemployment rate of around 50%, of which youth between 
15-27 years old made up a large percentage. Despite the existence of three sawmills in the 
area, Nak’ azdli members made up less than 1% of their workforce (Nak’al koh Timber Ltd., 
1994).
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Nak’al koh Timber 
Ltd.
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Nak’ azdli Band
Tl’oh Forest Products
Apollo Forest Products
50%
Figure 2. Organizational Structure of Tl’oh Forest Products Ltd. Collaborative Joint Venture 
(Nak’al koh Timber, 1994, p.3)
The goal for Tl’oh was to ensure First Nation employment in all aspects of the 
organization from managers and supervisors to floor staff and maintenance personnel. It was 
hoped that 75% of the workers would be Nak’azdli members with at least one in a supervisor 
role. With equal opportunity hiring policies it was hoped that women would fill many 
positions. One member would be trained as a Human Resources Manager. After the first 
year, opportunities for sponsorship to attend a two year forest products management program 
at the B.C. Institute of Technology (BCIT), in Burnaby, would be made available to qualified 
employees. Nak’al koh proposed to employ one person in field-level forest management 
duties and nine people in harvesting activities.
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Results
For the Nak’azdli First Nation, the Tl'oh partnership has developed many forms of
ownership. The Nak’azdli are co-owners in Tl'oh and full owners of Nak’al koh. The
significance that ‘ownership’ has for the Nak’azdli is reflected in their proposal to the
provincial government for wood access:
“The Nak’ azdli Band believes that control of this [TSL] License solely 
by the Band through the Band’s ownership of Nak’al koh is an important 
step in the progress towards the settlement of outstanding treaty claims 
(Nak’al koh Timber, 1994, p. 2).”
The partnership has also created a sense of community ownership especially with
respect to Tl'oh. Interviewed respondents from both Apollo and Tl'oh commented on the
positive community response and sense of ownership with respect to Tl'oh.
As reflected in Chief Harold’s words:
“The Nak'azdli have the lead role in the mill. The small business licence is
under the First Nation's name although we are in a 50/50 partnership,
the mill is still considered Nak'azdli's mill. It is on our reserve, and our people 
have the first priority. It is identifiable as our mill.” (NAFA, 1997, p.57)
According to Scott Shettel (pers. comm., June 1998), the community’s sense of
ownership has contributed to both the overall business successes of Tl'oh, high First Nation
employment participation rates and low absenteeism.
Management
Overall management direction of Tl'oh is facilitated through a Board of Directors 
having equal representation from Nak’al koh and Apollo. According to Mr. Shettel, a 50/50 
partnership is ideal in the sense that negotiations related to unforeseen circumstances cannot
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simply be vetoed by a controlling partner, but rather a degree of consensus is required of both 
parties before actions are taken.
As part of the partnership Apollo provides a certain degree of management assistance 
and advice to Tl’oh; largely concerning the management of Nak’al koh’s timber tenures. To 
support Nak’al koh in the completion of forestry planning documents such as forest 
development plans and road permits, Apollo has made available the assistance of a 
professional forester for such field-level activities as supervision and inspection.
Management Style
Tl'oh has adopted Apollo’s general movement towards employee-centric 
organizational style. Employees are encouraged to provide feedback and make suggestions 
concerning manufacturing processes. Employee concerns can be raised directly through shop 
foremen and during regular safety and training meetings. Concerns raised with foremen are 
brought up with Tl'oh’s manager during weekly meetings. The manager maintains informal 
relations with all the employees and has stated openness to directly hearing of employee 
concerns. Employee concerns can be brought up by the manager during monthly Board of 
Directors meetings.
Training
Employee-wide training initiated through the partnership is largely restricted to on-
the-job training, safety meetings and periodic industry-related upgrading (i.e. Workplace
Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS), etc.) Trained shop foremen oversee job
rotation; provide informal training in equipment usage; and answer employee questions into
value-added manufacturing processes. The two foremen were sponsored to attend Forest
Renewal B.C's Value-added Wood Products Centre in Abbotsford. A millwright is currently
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apprenticing with Tl’oh. Further training opportunities, pending qualified applicants, include 
sponsorship for a two-year, value-added manufacturing program at BCIT in Vancouver.
With respect to Nak’al koh, four members are employed and three members are in 
training for field-level forest management planning activities required by the Forest License. 
Further, Nak’al koh partnered with a local forest planning contractor to carry out planning 
activities which specifically involved training and employment opportunities for First Nation 
members. The contract company has made available positions in cruising (forest 
mensuration) and layout (harvest planning) and provides opportunities for First Nations 
members to job-shadow with staff in active field sites. Technical training - both start up and 
on-going -  was carried out by governments and third parties in association with the 
partnership. During Tl'oh's start-up, the Prince George Native Training Association, 
Aboriginal Business Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) and the Nak'azdli all 
contributed to a comprehensive training program for Tl'oh employees involving life skills, 
first aid, lumber grading and initial on-the-job-training. Periodic training in the venture 
included lumber grading, administration techniques, and safety programs.
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Employment
To date over 85% of the 60 employees at Tl’oh are Nak’azdli members with a number 
of those positions held by women and youth between 18 and 27 years. Two members hold 
supervisory positions. However, there are currently no members in upper management 
positions. On the other hand, 100% percent of Nak’al koh’s workforce of 12-15 people are 
First Nation.
Cultural Support
Community interests are represented by Nak’azdli council members who participate 
on Tl'oh and Nak’ al koh Boards of Directors. Company investments in community activities 
are restricted to common practices of corporate citizenship carried out by Apollo, such as 
sponsoring minor hockey teams and donating to local charities. Through mutual partner 
consent, the Nak’azdli have assumed responsibilities for community obligations related to the 
Tl’oh venture.
Recognition
All legal contracts related to the venture contain clauses stating that activities will be 
carried out without prejudice to Nak’azdli treaty claims.
Relations
Good formal and informal relations between Nak’azdli and Apollo can be attributed
to careful negotiations carried out before operations began, and to Apollo’s innovative
approach. Beginning in 1993, the Nak’azdli spent a great deal of time negotiating with
potential co-venturers, preparing proposals and securing support and funding through
government agencies before Tl'oh finally started up in late 1995 (NAFA, 1997, p.71). Apollo
made substantial efforts to facilitate the Tl’oh venture. Aside from technical cooperation in
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the proposal, negotiation and agreement development stages, Apollo’s commitment to the 
Nak’ azdli’s wish for community involvement, secured their proposal over three other rival 
corporate venture bids.
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Dezti Wood Ltd. - Industrial Partnership between Plateau Forest 
Products/Vanderhoof Specialty Wood Products Ltd.
This case study was based on information obtained through Dezti’s TSL proposal (Ne 
Duchun,1994) and personal interviews carried out in the summer of 1998 with former-Chief 
Jacqueline Thomas, Saik’uz Nation, Stoney Creek; Kate Morin, Nadleh Whut’en Economic 
Development Officer, Ft. Fraser; Ted Anthony, Manager, Plateau Forest Products, 
Vanderhoof; George Lacerte, Director, Ne Duchun Forest Products, Vanderhoof (Pers. 
Comm., Jan. 1999); and Del Blackstock, Carrier-Sekanni Tribal Council, Prince George.
Located 100 kilometres west of Prince George, the Dezti venture is within the 
jurisdiction of the MOF Vanderhoof Forest District which administers approximately
850,000 ha of pine/spruce forest lands with an annual allowable cut of around 1.7 million 
cubic metres. Sixty-four percent of the cut is allocated to four large mills in the Vanderhoof 
area: West Fraser Sawmill- Fraser Lake Division; L & M Lumber Company; Plateau Forest 
Products; and Lakeland Mills (MOF, 1997). Forest products manufacture and forestry are the 
dominant industries in Vanderhoof and directly employ 26% of the workforce (BC Stats, 
1996).
The Dezti collaboration began in early 1991 with a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between local bands and the MOF as part of increased initiatives related to Treaty 
interim measures. The purpose of the MOU was to “.. .increase First Nations participation in 
planning, management, harvesting and manufacturing in the forest sector.”(BC Ministry of 
Aboriginal Affairs (MAA), 1997). Major developments connected with the MOU included 
the Dezti specialty-cut mill venture and establishment of a community staffed MOF fire 
protection Unit Crew.
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The major partners in the Dezti venture are Vanderhoof Specialty Wood Products 
(YSW), Plateau Forest Products Ltd. - Slocan Group (Plateau), and a First Nation consortium 
company. Ne Duchun Forest Products Ltd. (Ne Duchun). Established in 1989, Ne Duchun 
was established to facilitate economic activities on behalf of three First Nations in the area: 
the Nadleh Whut’en, Stellaquo, and Saik’uz.(Stoney Creek). Since 1990, Ne Duchun has 
been involved in reforestation, tree spacing and seed cone collecting contracts with the 
Vanderhoof MOF and Plateau. Ne Duchun is responsible for a 20 person, community Unit 
Crew for MOF fire protection activities, as well as harvesting and timber management of
50,000 cubic metres of timber on their awarded TSL. VSW is a relatively small, specialty 
forest products mill making housing components which started in 1990. Plateau is an 
integrated forest company that produces dimensional lumber for a North American market.
A year after the venturers signed a private Memorandum of Understanding in 1993, 
the Dezti venture was launched. The Dezti facility produces fingerjoined window and door 
stock and laminated posts, using waste stock from the VSW and Plateau mills. Sawdust and 
shavings obtained from all partner operations were to be used to produce heating pellets in a 
proposed wood pellet plant. Ne Duchun has a 51% stake in Dezti while Plateau and VSW 
equally hold the remaining shares (See Figure 3).
Goals related to ABD capacity-building are set out as objectives in Dezti’s business 
proposal. According to the Ne Duchun proposal (1994), a key objective outlined is “ .. .to 
provide native people with the necessary training and work experience to ensure that they are 
able to fill as many of the new jobs as possible” (p. 13). Dezti proposed to offer right of first
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Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the Dezti Joint Venture
refusal to partner First Nations with respect to 50 new employment positions -  44 in the 
remanufacturing facility and six in the pellet plant. All harvesting and forest management 
obligations were to be contracted out to Ne Duchun to provide eight full-time equivalent 
employment positions. Plateau further offered to help Dezti establish a silviculture program 
to capitalize on such opportunities as site preparation, mistletoe eradication, planting, and tree 
spacing tied to Dezti’s timber tenure. Such work was expected to provide about 4 full-time 
equivalent employment positions. It was proposed that VSW and Plateau would work with 
Dezti to coordinate on-the-job training and develop an ‘all operations’ worker exchange 
program. On-going safety and industrial training would be the responsibility of VSW and to 
a lesser degree Plateau. The Slocan Group and VSW committed to provide marketing 
services and training for the three First Nation representatives on Dezti’s management 
committee.
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Results
Ownership
The three First Nations share ownership of Ne Duchun, a principal shareholder, as 
well as contractor for Dezti. Together, they hold controlling interest in Dezti at 51%. With 
fewer First Nation members employed as a result of the suspension of a majority of Dezti’s 
operations in 1997 after the Asian market collapse, community perceptions of Dezti are not 
completely positive. While Dezti was running, the Saik'uz Nation Council were not entirely 
happy with both their level of participation in management and having to pay substantial 
management fees while Dezti struggled. After the brief shutdown, Dezti re-opened to begin 
producing a much reduced product line of building studs. According to Jacqueline Thomas, 
over the last few years the Saik’uz were covering losses of around $25,000 per year (pers. 
comm., 1998).
Management
In the beginning, VSW maintained responsibility for the overall management of 
Dezti. First Nation participation in Dezti management included representation on the 
management committee, employment in managerial/supervisory positions and logging/safety 
committees. Each Nation sent two chosen candidates to be employed and trained in 
management and supervisory positions, respectively. Due to differences between the 
Industry partners, management responsibilities were shifted, one year into operation, from 
VSW to Plateau and then as of 1998, back to VSW. This resulted in the loss of the three First 
Nation management employment positions. The displaced managers maintained 
representation on the management committee, but no managerial training materialized. 
However, according to Mr. Lacerte, the year of collaborative involvement in management
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with VSW provided important experiences and lessons for value-added manufacture. With 
respect to planning and cost estimates, expected conversions of raw materials to value-added 
products were overestimated as the Dezti plant had lower wood recovery rates than standard 
lumber mill conversion factors that were used.
Management Style
Under VSW, management followed a team-centred production approach involving 
job rotation within the Dezti plant. Contracts between Dezti and Ne Duchun were 
characteristically verbal agreements. Operational concerns were managed by the forest 
company, while major spending decisions were dealt with by the management committee. 
Despite a team-centred approach and proposed measures to include/train First Nation 
members in management positions, overall continuity of Dezti’s management approach was 
substantially disrupted. First Nation management trainee positions were lost, employees 
subjected to differing management styles, and the proposed innovative employee exchange 
program failed to materialize. The fledgling Ne Duchun experienced significant management 
growing pains as they took on an extremely ambitious mandate of assuming business 
responsibilities not only for the Dezti facility but also for harvesting operations and fire 
protection/silviculture crews.
Training
HRDC and FRBC provided initial support for employee job readiness and life skills
training, as well as on-the-job training in conjunction with VSW and Plateau. However, the
proposed ‘all operations’ worker exchange program which would allow for experienced Dezti
workers to substitute-in, at a higher rate of pay, for absent Plateau employees and gain
exposure to a variety of sawmilling activities, never materialized. Although Plateau pledged
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to provide training assistance, no major programs have been introduced. Aside from initial 
job-readiness activities, very little subsequent training for either on-the floor or management 
positions has been carried out. The dissolution of the management committee further 
represents a loss of First Nations exposure to management activities. No formal 
apprenticeships or scholarships were made available.
Employment
Except for six positions tied to the proposed pellet plant, Dezti met most proposed 
goals for employment in the first two years of operation. Within the second year, Dezti 
employment rose to 68 people. A local First Nation member was established as the central 
harvesting contractor, employing and sub-contracting the services of 10-12 First Nation 
members.
Due to the Asian market crisis, the staff was downsized to only 12 people (1998 
figure) in the production of a reduced product line of building studs. Expected improvement 
in silviculture employment through contracts related to Dezti’s timber tenure (TSL) failed to 
materialize as silviculture obligations were carried out by other more competitive MOF 
contractors, rather than Ne Duchun.
Cultural Support
VSW and Plateau are the main agents for charitable community donations related to 
Dezti. Aside from considerable contributions to the Vanderhoof community, no charitable 
programs are specifically targeted to First Nation communities.
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Recognition
Aside from a standard legal clause in the venture agreement which states the business 
will proceed without prejudice to First Nation treaty claims.
Many innovative methods were developed and proposed to develop a positive 
relationship with First Nations in the Dezti venture. This included management training; 
majority representation on the management committee; the proposed ‘all operations’ worker 
exchange program and general partner commitments to keep a reduced number of people 
employed despite the major market downturn. However, the loss of substantial First Nation 
employment and management positions; frequent management disruptions; and the failure of 
the worker exchange program to materialize have all contributed to strained relations between 
the general partners and Ne Duchun. Furthermore, the relations between the individual First 
Nations collaborating in Ne Duchun have increasingly turned antagonistic as concerns 
emerged about equity in the hiring of First Nation members. According to some First Nation 
respondents, it was felt that Dezti’s hiring and contracting practices were favoring certain 
Nations over others. Respondents involved in the management of Dezti confirmed the 
venture had unequal representation of individual Nation members, but suggest that it was 
largely due to unexpectedly high employee turnover combined with a policy to hire “best 
qualified” candidates. Regardless of cause, the lack of addressing employment equity issues 
in Dezti, has led to not only increasing conflict between the collaborating First Nations 
economic organizations but also respective community members.
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Kyahwood Forest Products Ltd. 
Moricetown Band and Northwood Pulp and Paper
This case example is based on information obtained from the Moricetown Band’s 
TSL/FL proposal (Kyahwood, 1994) and interviews with Mr. Terry LaLonde, Manager, 
Kyahwood; Ron Mitchell, Band Manager, Moricetown Band; and Mr. Graeme Hynd, 
Regional Forester, MOF Prince Rupert Region.
A joint venture between Northwood Pulp and Paper® and the Moricetown Band, 
Kyahwood Forest Products Ltd. (Kyahwood) produces odd-sized and fingerjoined studs for 
the southern US housing market. Kyahwood is located approximately 30 kilometres west of 
Smithers in the village of Moricetown which is primarily a First Nation community 
comprised of members of the Moricetown Band. Together the Moricetown, Hagwilget and 
Nee-Tahi-Buhn Bands form the larger Wet'suwet'en Nation.
According to the MOF (1994), the Bulkley/Cassiar Forest District in Smithers 
administers approximately 750,000 ha of diverse forest land; ranging from pine/spruce forest 
types to higher elevation hemlock/cedar. Accounting for about 44% of all incomes, forestry 
and forest products manufacture are major industries in the Bulkley-Nechako region. Major 
forest industries operating in the area are Pacific Inland Resources (PIR), Skeena Cellulose 
and Northwood.
The Kyahwood joint venture began as early as 1993 with a three-year consultation 
and proposal writing process carried out between the Wet’suwet’en Nation, represented by 
the Moricetown Band Council, and Northwood Pulp and Paper, Houston, BC. Upon securing 
TSL and Forest License timber tenures in 1997, the Kyahwood joint venture and the 
Moricetown Band-owned logging company, Kyah Industries, were established. The 
Kyahwood plant produces fingerjoined lumber and specialty housing components, while
® Now owned by Canadian Forest Products
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Kyah Industries is the central logging contractor for the awarded timber tenures. The 
Wet’suwet’en have a 51% and 100% stake in Kyahwood and Kyah Industries, respectively. 
Around ninety-nine percent of the operation’s 56 employees are First Nations members.
Wet’suwet’en
Moricetown, Hagwilget Nee-Tahi-Buhn
/
Managed by 
Moricetown Band
100%
Kyah Industries
51%
V
Northwood Pulp and Paper
Kyahwood Forest Products 
(Joint Venture)
Figure 4. Organizational Structure of the Kyahwood Joint Venture
Goals
Major AED capacity-building goals of the venture are to both “ .. .develop and 
encourage native employment” (Kyahwood, 1994, p. 11) and provide capacity-building 
training. Goals for First Nation employment levels in Kyahwood were set for at least 90% of 
formal positions. In order to promote indirect employment opportunities, Kyah Industries 
and associated subcontractors are offered harvesting contracts with a right of first refusal. 
Indirect opportunities include subcontracting in trucking milled wood pieces to Kyahwood, as 
well as silviculture work related to Forest License obligations. With respect to training, 
partners jointly agreed to share responsibility for costs and procurement.
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Results
Ownership
In terms of ownership, the Wet’suwet’en hold a 51% share in Kyahwood and a 100% 
stake in Kyah Industries. Further, the option is open for the Wet’suwet’en to eventually 
become sole owner of the venture. Within the community, there is a positive sense of 
ownership with respect to the venture. Proactive company measures such as on-going 
consultation with a community council; sponsoring of community social events; and high 
profile, First Nation symbols on company logos and packaging have all contributed to a 
positive sense of community ownership of Kyahwood.
Management
Kyahwood collaboration is officially recognized as a joint venture. Specifically, it is 
a limited partnership qualified by a legal Joint Operating Agreement (JOA). Although the 
Wet’suwet’en have controlling interest, the parties agreed to equal representation on the 
BODs and designation of Northwood as the managing, general partner.
A Management Committee with binding decision-making authority was formed from 
staff equally nominated from Northwood and the Wet’suwet’en to assume operational-level 
responsibilities in aspects of initial facility construction, plant and tenure management and 
personnel administration.
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The Northwood-designated head manager is privy to concerns brought up in regularly held 
Clan representative meetings, as well as through an informal open-door policy for employees. 
By mutual consent, Kyahwood is to be run strictly as a business - with the Management 
Committee as the deciding authority. First Nation governance is delegated the responsibility 
for addressing local political issues and advising Kyahwood of community concerns.
Management Style
Although no cross-cultural training was provided for Kyahwood management, INAC- 
sponsored governance administration courses, covering elements of management 
communication, were jointly attended by representatives from both the Band and Northwood. 
The day-to-day management approach is team-centred, involving daily job rotation in floor 
operations. Safety and crew meetings occur on a monthly and weekly basis, respectively. 
Although Kyahwood is non-unionized, employees receive industry-standard wages and job 
flexibility.
Kyahwood’s management approach involved significant measures to include cultural 
concerns. Out of respect for culture-specific, community events, objectives for the annual 
operating year were adjusted down from 250 working days to 230. In hiring, a volunteer 
group of First Nation Elders is responsible to pre-screen and recommend prospective 
community employees. A volunteer social committee was formed to provide input for 
community events -  the first being a community-wide salmon barbecue on Kyahwood’s 
grand opening.
Training
At the beginning of the venture, job-readiness training was sponsored through FRBC
in coordination with INAC administration training. Floor supervisors and managers provide
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weekly crew meetings and on-the-job training as needed. Periodic safety training programs 
have been initiated to keep employee certification up to date. Advanced training 
opportunities are open for interested long-term employees. As of 1998 they had one planer 
apprentice working with them.
Employment
Employment levels of 99% community members exceeded original goals. Women 
make up at least 35% of the workforce. However, no suitable candidate emerged for the 
trucking subcontract. The logging company, Kyah Industries, is currently operating with 
around ten First Nation employees.
Cultural Support
Kyahwood has demonstrated commitment to community interests in Moricetown by 
maintaining close council with Wet’suwet’en leaders and targeting charitable donations to the 
First Nations community. Some activities carried out since 1998 were assistance in building 
a children’s playground, two-Northwood sponsored tours of Kyahwood for local grade five 
and six students and the community-wide salmon barbecue. Attempts have been made to 
reestablish a once active Moricetown hockey team.
Recognition
In the formal JOA, specific clauses state that Kyahwood is carried out without 
prejudice to First Nation claims and treaty negotiations. Attempts have been made to 
structure the business around cultural practices. If necessary, a partial day shut-down can be 
carried out to honor an important community event.
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All major stakeholders - the Wet’suwet’en, Northwood and provincial and federal 
governments - partnered to play a key role in the success of Kyahwood. Impetus for the 
venture began with the Wet’suwet’en petitioning governments to modify available timber 
supply profiles - tied to their outdated dimensional lumber mill, Kyah Forest Products - in 
order to allow for a value-added facility, Kyahwood. Much of the proposal generation and 
negotiation phase of the JOA development for Kyahwood was carried out privately between 
Northwood and the Wet’suwet’en over a three-year period. Before any on-the-ground 
operations began both parties wanted to ensure a business agreement which could weather 
any foreseeable contingency.
In summation, the cases of four joint ventures were individually detailed and 
examined with respect to how well they addressed capacity building aspects of applied 
elements of Aboriginal Economic Development. The next chapter provides a summary of the 
case examinations and goes on to discuss their implications with respect to the overall role 
joint ventures have in capacity building and broader policy regimes.
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Chapter Five
Case Summaries
Drawing on literature surrounding Aboriginal Economic Development in Chapter One 
and community expectations - as reflected in venture proposal document and case interviews 
- this chapter explores case-study outcomes to evaluate the contributions of joint ventures 
with respect to AED and broader policy regimes.
Venture Viability
Out of the four ventures examined only two have maintained ‘continuous’ 
operations’. In 1998, both Dezti and BSW unexpectedly shut down a vast proportion of their 
operations in response to major market downturns in Asia. Both ventures eventually 
reopened with Dezti operating on a reduced staff and product line (building studs). It should 
be noted, however, that although these ventures suffered temporary shutdowns they did not 
completely fail or go bankrupt. The backing of the major partners enabled venture facilities 
and other assets to be retained.
The ability of any economic venture to build capacities is critically dependent on that 
venture’s survival as a business. First Nation economic development is immediately and 
adversely affected by the loss of crucial direct benefits such as wages and investment capital. 
But most importantly. First Nation confidence is shaken when businesses fail. In a defunct 
business, further opportunities for capacity-building in areas of training and management 
vanish. Even if First Nation participation in share equity and management is initially low.
’ A particular venture’s definition of continuous operation depends not so much on the calendar year but rather 
on outlined goals and objectives.
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there is future opportunity to renegotiate venture terms in a successful business (Lewis and 
Hatton, 1992).
Venture Type
All ventures examined were limited partnerships (Annex 1) modified as a result of 
negotiations between industry and First Nation partners. Although only Kyahwood operated 
under a formal Joint Operating Agreement, the partnership agreements of the other ventures 
provided similar protections, rights and responsibilities. The agreements limited the financial 
risks facing First Nations to their capital investments and not venture assets and associated 
liabilities. Except for Bums Lake Specialty Wood, the degrees of First Nation representation 
on management boards were greater than ownership levels. In all cases, the forest 
companies assumed management responsibilities for the joint venture operations.
Ownership
Two central aspects of First Nation participation in joint ventures were identified as 
significant to First Nation economic development: current and future levels of First Nation 
ownership, and difficulties encountered in First Nation consortium forest companies.
All the ventures examined are characterized by a relatively high degree of First 
Nation ownership. Equity ownership in all ventures is balanced between 50% and 51%. For 
the First Nations involved in Dezti and Tl’oh, the ventures represents their first ownership 
stakes in major forest manufacturing facilities. Shared ownership in Kyahwood has allowed 
the Moricetown Band to revitalize their idled lumber mill into a progressive value-added 
facility. While stakes in BSW have increased First Nation levels of ownership in forestry 
manufacturing. All ventures resulted in the creation of fully-owned First Nation logging 
companies.
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Although in many instances, the AED literature (Cradock, 1998; Anderson 1999) 
suggests that full First Nation ownership of economic ventures is a desired state, a number of 
First Nation community representatives I talked with, sought collaborative ventures in which 
financial risks are minimized. According to Lewis and Hatton (1992), joint ventures are 
useful in that they minimize First Nation exposure to financial risks and liabilities in multi­
million dollar ventures. Minimization of risk is especially important to First Nation economic 
organizations that are relatively new and/or taking on a completely new line of business. In 
all case examples, large-scale production of specialty wood components is a business in 
which the First Nation economic organizations and co-venturing forest companies have 
relatively little experience. As Wilson (1996) points out, specialty wood manufacturers in 
Canada face substantial risks as markets for products are limited and face stiff competition 
from well-established European and Asian firms. In the cases of Kyahwood and Tl’oh, First 
Nation representatives stated that, for the time being, the levels of First Nation equity 
investment and respective limited liabilities were suited to the degree of risk they felt 
comfortable with.
Whether or not greater or full ownership levels in forestry joint ventures build 
capacity for AED largely depends on the longer-terms goals of First Nation partners. For 
some Nations such as the Saik’uz, who have expressed an interest in future diversification 
away from a forestry-dominated economy, greater venture ownership levels may not be a 
priority. Yet, most First Nation representatives hinted that eventual increased First Nation 
ownership in ventures was desirable.
Except for the Kyahwood venture, there was little indication in proposal documents 
and interviewee responses of concerted measures to allow for greater First Nation ownership 
of the ventures in the future. In the Kyahwood agreement, details concerning changes to
ownership centred largely on ensuring that existing supply arrangements be maintained.
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However, it seems that the norm for agreements in more recently formed joint ventures in BC 
is to include more detailed options for increasing First Nation ownership levels in the future 
(NTTA, 1997).
It is possible that a First Nation goal for increased ownership levels in joint ventures 
conflicts with parallel capacity-building goals of minimizing financial risk and increased 
participation in management. By the nature of the legal agreements used in the case ventures, 
increased involvement in the management of operations (imparted by greater ownership 
levels) opens First Nation partners to increased financial and legal risks. As outlined by 
VanDuzer (1997), a limited partner is subject to losing their limited liability if that partner 
takes part in the control of the business as opposed to a more advisory role (p.60). 
Consequently, joint venture ownership levels that minimize risk may be creating 
disincentives for First Nation groups to pursue greater levels of management participation 
and ownership. As the Bums Lake venture example points out, management participation and 
ownership in Babine Forest Products has changed little despite 25 years of First Nation 
involvement as a limited partner.
Relationships between First Nation venture partners is another aspect affecting 
capacity building for economic development. In ventures involving First Nation consortia, a 
great deal of conflict developed between the individual First Nation groups over time. With 
minority status in the BLNDC consortium, concerns of the Bums Lake Band centred on a 
lack of say in venture and lending activities. Both the Bums Lake Band and the Saik’uz First 
Nation were concemed with the lack of equitable hiring and contracting of their members for 
on-going venture positions and contracts. As the responsible organizations, the management 
committees of the consortia ended up bearing the bmnt of animosity of First Nation partners. 
As Del Blackstock of the Carrier-Sekanni Tribal Council points out, fledgling consortia, set
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up primarily for business administration, are poorly prepared for resolving or negotiating 
venture-related political issues.
Sources of consortia conflict seem to be a lack of common understanding of rights 
and responsibilities, especially when unforeseen circumstances affect venture operations. 
According to proposal documents and respondents involved in consortia for the BSW and 
Dezti ventures, First Nation rights and responsibilities, as negotiated at the beginning of 
venture activities, were generally well known to First Nation representatives involved in the 
consortia. Flowever, when unforeseen circumstances occurred, such as greater-than-expected 
levels of employee resignation, rights and responsibilities tied to subsequent rehiring were 
less known. The wider First Nation communities whom the consortia represent may be even 
less aware of their rights and responsibilities in joint venture activities and/or what benefits 
are accruing from the ventures if these issues were not properly communicated to them from 
the beginning.
Management
In the cases examined. First Nation involvement in the management of joint ventures 
focused on participation on Boards of Directors (BODs), activities of Nation-owned 
harvesting companies and a number of floor-level supervisor positions. The forest company 
partners (general partners) carried out management of manufacturing activities and forestry 
responsibilities tied to timber supply licenses.
Except for the Bums Lake venture. First Nation partners held equal or greater levels
of representation on BODs. This representation allowed First Nation partners the opportunity
to both participate in management activities and, if necessary, demand consensus in BCD’s
decision making. As attested by interview respondents who sat on the BODs of Kyahwood
and Dezti, directors were involved in exploring many aspects of value-added forest product
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manufacturing and management. However, as BODs decision making is often restricted to 
very broad-level management responsibilities such as major investments and general changes 
to business approach, First Nation directors who are not directly employed in and/or closely 
cooperating with venture operations may lack exposure to detailed operational management 
activities (Volker, 1999). Nonetheless, all First Nation members on venture BODs in this 
study had at least one representative who was personally involved with venture/forestry 
operations.
Through their respective forestry companies. First Nation partners were involved in 
the management of harvesting activities tied to awarded timber tenures. In collaboration with 
the Industry partner, the forestry companies ensured that all harvesting activities were in 
compliance with all forest practice and environmental protection regulations. Further 
responsibilities for forest planning and silviculture obligations were required for those 
companies issued Forest Licences. However, either the Industry partner or a consulting 
company carried out most forest management activities. In the Tl’oh venture, an innovative 
agreement with a local forest planning contractor allowed for the creation of a limited number 
of field positions for Nak’azdli members and the opportunity for other members to 
accompany or ‘job shadow’ during planning activities.
The provision of First Nation supervisor or foreman positions that include
opportunities for advancement, which floor staff can strive to achieve, represents a positive
step to building First Nation management capacity over the long-term. In all ventures,
motivated employees identified and selected as supervisors were involved with various
aspects of personnel and process management that included participation in various
management meetings and consultations. Educational opportunities tied to supervisor
positions in the Tl’oh venture motivated two foremen in the Tl’oh venture to further pursue
advanced studies in value-added manufacturing processes. Such advanced management
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skills are highly transferable to other managerial positions in a variety of economic activities 
that may be undertaken by a First Nation (Lewis and Hatton, 1992). Management positions 
that allow for professional advancement have potential to motivate other First Nation 
employees and community members to excel and achieve in their work. This is because 
candidates who have advanced from a floor position to accomplish various management 
responsibilities and skills development, serve as important peer models and mentors with 
respect to what is possible for First Nation members to achieve (Nthomang and Rankopo,
1997). But, except for Tl’oh, provisions for managerial positions with significant 
advancement opportunities were not widely implemented in the examined joint ventures.
First Nation venture partners are involved in management of forest resources through 
their contract harvesting businesses, responsibilities for procurement of timber supply 
licenses (TSL & FL) and, in the more recently negotiated ventures, administration of harvest 
and silviculture activities involved with Forest Licenses (FLs). Yet, in cases where First 
Nations held responsibilities for timber licenses, the Industry partners often carried out a 
large proportion of their administration. In the case where Tl’oh’s Nak’al koh Timber held 
responsibilities for the Forest Licence, the bulk of forest management planning and fieldwork 
activities were contracted out to a consulting firm. In all ventures, there is little indication of 
First Nation involvement in important aspects of forest management such as long-term 
planning of harvesting, silviculture and environmental protection activities; timely 
preparation of permits and applications; scheduling of field and office duties; and supervision 
of personnel involved in multiple activities.
It is commonly agreed that increased Indigenous stewardship over forestlands and
natural resources is important for sustained Aboriginal Economic Development (McLay,
1993; NTTA, 1993; Young, 1995; RCAP, 1996; NAFA, 1997; Prystupa, 1998). If First
Nations participating in joint ventures wish to have greater control over forest management
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activities in the future, greater exposure to detailed aspects of forest and natural resource 
management is needed. A central barrier to participation is that the main licensing instrument 
supplying value-added joint ventures, the TSL, does not entail forest management planning 
responsibilities. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section on ownership issues, legal 
barriers exist with regard to the extent First Nations can be involved in management before 
they become financially liable. However, within the context joint ventures are operating in a 
number of improvements could be made to increase forest management involvement. A 
greater diversity of licenses involving forest management responsibilities should be made 
available for joint ventures. Aside from entailing greater involvement in forest planning, 
provision of relatively unplanned licenses would allow for greater management flexibility, as 
planning and harvesting activities could be better synchronized with Industry partner 
activities. Added effort can be made to include more Industry and consulting positions for 
First Nation members that will involve them in detailed aspects of forest management 
planning.
Training
Training is an important component of all ventures. Employee training occurred at 
two broad levels: one transitional and the other skills-based. Life skills and other job 
readiness courses were implemented through such agencies as the federal government’s 
HRDC and INAC, BC Government, FRBC, and the First Nation-managed Prince George 
Native Training Association. Life skills training aimed to develop skills necessary for a 
transition from marginal rural, and often subsistence-influenced, economies, to a technical 
skills-based economy linked to value-added wood manufacturing industries. Often in 
conjunction with life skills training, skills-based technical training was usually held during 
the onset of venture operations. Training programs typically involved technical instruction in
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machinery operation, value-added manufacturing processes, informal on-the-job instruction, 
job rotation, workplace safety and first aid.
Out of the four ventures, only Tl’oh involved formal opportunities for advanced 
training and education. This included an FRBC certificate program in value-added wood 
products manufacturing for two First Nation floor supervisors. An additional scholarship 
opportunity for a two-year, BC Institute of Technology diploma in value-added manufacture 
is open for a qualifying First Nation member.
With respect to all ventures examined, there is a general lack of management training 
for First Nation members -  especially in skills for effective participation in BODs, 
management committees and negotiations. With the exception of the INAC communications 
course attended by Kyahwood management, none of the ventures involved formal 
management training for First Nations. Although it was proposed that Dezti would provide 
training to First Nation members on the management committee, none materialized. Only 
Tl’oh’s partnership with a local planning contractor provided First Nation members with 
formal exposure to field-level forest management duties tied to venture operations.
Although all respondents acknowledged the utility of start-up employee skills 
training, many suggested that more on-going training should be supported. In many cases, 
few additional resources were allocated for on-going training as venture partners had not 
anticipated on-going employment needs. Dezti experienced some production problems and 
added costs when higher-than-expected employee turnover rates compelled the hiring of new 
First Nations members lacking essential basic education and life skills training (Ted Anthony, 
Per s. Comm., Nov. 1999).
To better facilitate training and improve employee screening, it was a common
Industry suggestion that an employee pool of potential candidates, with at least a secondary-
level of education (Grade 12), be created and maintained in partnership with First Nations,
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industry and government agencies. Providing comprehensive training on a person-by-person 
basis is considered highly impractical for small to medium-sized enterprises (Pers. Comm. 
Barry Metzner, Aug. 1998). More feasible is the provision of on-going training and skills 
upgrading to groups of employees who share similar levels of basic education and technical 
skills needed for the job at hand. Under the administration of First Nation members, a 
proposed employee pool could facilitate periodic training and skills upgrading for both 
potential pool candidates, as well as venture employees. Combined employee/pool candidate 
training would serve to lower training costs and give lower-qualified candidates an 
opportunity to up-grade their skills.
In most of the cases examined, basic frameworks for First Nation employment pools 
were already incorporated in venture agreements. Except in BSW, it was agreed that First 
Nation partners would shoulder responsibilities for selecting and recommending potential 
employees from the community. However, virtually all pool frameworks suffered from a 
lack of resources and institutions for basic, on-going and advanced training in value-added 
forest product manufacturing and human resource development.
In summation, government and general partner support for on-going, capacity- 
building training for First Nation members (and other employees) involved in the joint 
ventures tend to focus on start-up activities. There is need for greater long-term, 
collaborative partnerships between government. Industry, and First Nation partners to provide 
more on-going and comprehensive training opportunities for venture employees.
Employment
Three out of four ventures met First Nation employment goals as set out in proposal
documents. Kyahwood and Tl’oh exceeded their proposed goals for First Nation
employment positions; Eighty-five and ninety-nine percent of the workforce in Tl’oh and
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Kyahwood, respectively, were First Nation. BSW experienced short-term layoffs in 
conjunction with temporary plant shutdowns but have since restored employment levels and 
demographics. Dezti’s operation was unsuccessful in achieving proposed employment 
targets. Except for BSW, First Nation partners raised no concerns over the validity of 
employment level forecasts in venture proposals. Representative BLNDC stakeholders were 
concemed over the low percentage of First Nation employees (approx. 30%) and expected 
employment levels would increase from the 1992 figure to one commensurate with levels 
commonly attained in recent joint venture agreements.
In terms of innovations for employment practices, Dezti worked to develop a tri­
company employee exchange program and a wage incentive system to reduce absenteeism. 
Although the wage incentive system is still used, the employee exchange program has yet to 
materialize. In the case examples, it is apparent that innovations in employment practices are 
linked to venture success.
Tl’oh and Kyahwood invested a great deal of effort in the personnel selection process 
during planning and on-going stages of operations. These efforts involved incorporating First 
Nation institutions, such as Elder and Band councils, into personnel management systems 
within ventures.
Cultural Support
In general, the level of cultural support involved in the case ventures has been
minimal. Except for the participation of Kyahwood’s management personnel in a First
Nation-targeted administration and communication training course, none of the ventures
involved any form of cultural awareness courses for non-aboriginal management. Kyahwood
took steps to establish an allowance for plant shutdown in response to a community
emergency and to incorporate a community institution into management by extending
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authority to an Elders Council to assist in the process of employee selections. In the case of 
Tl’oh, it was agreed by venture partners that the Nak’ azdli would be responsible for social 
and cultural considerations related to the venture.
Both Kyahwood and Tl’oh made use of highly identifiable First Nation symbols in 
product packaging and venture regalia. Maintaining visibility of a First Nation-inspired 
venture is important in gaining overall community acceptance and sense of ownership. As 
detailed in the socioeconomic impact assessment of the defunct Orenda Pulp and Paper Mill 
collaboration near Terrace, despite many employment and financial benefits accruing to First 
Nation stakeholders, the venture was ultimately rejected (EDO Dunwoody and Columbia 
Pacific Group, 1993). Lack of community awareness about the venture was considered an 
important contributing factor to the venture’s eventual demise. In a study carried out with the 
First Nation community stakeholders, 80% of those surveyed were not aware that a First 
Nation organization was involved in the venture (Ibid, 1993).
Community Support
In most cases contributions to community events are usually through corporate 
donation programs of forest Industry partners. Activities ranged from local sports 
sponsorships to donations for community development NGOs such as the United Way and 
local food banks. Out of the four cases, only Kyahwood and Tl’oh targeted extra resources to 
fund local First Nation community activities. Kyahwood sponsored local community events 
such as the Salmon Barbecue and maintained close contact with an Elders Council. Tl’oh 
provided a training scholarship open to all Nak’ azdli Band members.
In the cases of Kyahwood and Tl’oh, community involvement, through venture- 
related social programming, was explicitly delegated to the respective First Nations.
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Programming examples included both involvement in human resource development of 
potential employee candidates and funding for general community initiatives.
Recognition
In all ventures, recognition of First Nation rights were largely restricted to legal 
guarantees that operations would be carried out without prejudice to First Nation claims 
and/or treaty negotiations between First Nations and governments. Lands utilized for venture 
facilities remained un-alienated as all are located on federal lands reserved for First Nations.
Aside from the standard legal clauses of non-interference with treaties, none of the 
agreements provided any acknowledgement or regard for the possibility of First Nation rights 
to land and resource stewardship. The dominant view among Industry representatives in this 
case is that treaty and First Nation rights determinations exist as legal burdens (uncertainty of 
rights) with respect to the management of and investments in Crown Forest tenures. In 
general, there seems to be a resistance by Industry to accept the possibility of multiple 
authorities governing lands and tenures. In fact, a policy statement issued by the BC forest 
industry lobby group. Council of Forest Industries, suggests legal acknowledgement of First 
Nation rights, other than those related to traditional subsistence and cultural practices, are 
actively resisted (COFI, 1995).
Many First Nation representatives I spoke with suggested that the overall climate of 
relations between Industry and First Nations is generally antagonistic. They argue that only 
now, as a result of legal entrenchment of First Nation rights, or local actions such as 
blockades, have government and Industry stakeholders moved to involve First Nations in 
major forest-based economic developments.
Although having largely acknowledged that First Nations will play an increasingly
important role in forest management, the Industry has generally been slow to follow the lead
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of developments occurring in other natural resource industry sectors. The extensive 
experience the energy and mining sectors have with respect to collaborative partnerships has 
led to some useful innovations. For example, by arranging legal agreements that were neutral 
with respect to stating exactly who the land-use authority was (government or First Nation) - 
in other words, providing a measure of recognition - the San Andreas joint mining 
exploration venture in the Northwest Territories was able to proceed on good terms with a 
Dene First Nation- known for its resistance to third-party development of contested treaty 
lands^ (Pers. Comm., Petr Cizek, Yellowknife, July, 1997).
For capacity building to be effective both First Nation and Industry partners need to 
develop better a better relationship. As stated by Mr. Anthony, Manager of Dezti’s Industry 
partner. Plateau Forest Products, “No matter how well negotiated a legal relationship is, 
without good informal partner ties, the sustained operation of any venture is at risk.”(Pers. 
Comm., Nov., 1999)
Local Policy Regimes
So far this chapter has provided an analysis of how capacity-building activities have 
or have not been applied in the case ventures. However, the relationship between specific 
activities carried out in the ventures and influences of broader policy regimes is not yet fully 
clear. This aspect can be considered by examining case study results in the context of policy 
regime concepts discussed earlier in this thesis.
The analysis of the case ventures and responses from others interviewed for this 
research reveal a number of innovative changes to institutions and actors involved in local 
policy regimes that support a trend of an enhanced role for First Nations in economic 
development and forestry issues. As discussed in Chapter Two, actors, institutions and ideas
' Treaty # 8 and 11
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surrounding economic development issues of Indigenous People in the cases of three 
countries and the province of British Columbia have increasingly evolved to form new policy 
regimes that are characterized by stronger relationships between industry, governments and 
Indigenous People.
In the case study ventures, First Nations, governments and forest companies all 
collaborated as actors in various capacity building initiatives such as training, joint venture 
negotiations and raising venture capital. In the TP oh and Kyahwood ventures, balanced 
representation on Boards of Directors and Management Committees afford the respective 
First Nation partners considerable say in management direction of ventures and some aspects 
of forest management activities on government timber licenses (TSLs & FLs).
Using the example of the earliest negotiated venture. Bums Lake Specialty Woods, as 
a basis, the particulars of the more recently established ventures demonstrate a progressive 
change in ideas surrounding local joint ventures. In the more recent venture proposals, less 
emphasis was placed on ‘rate of return on investment’ and more on capacity-building aspects 
such as increased levels of First Nation management participation and employment. In the 
BSW proposal, details on capacity building barely covered one page while in the most recent 
Kyahwood proposal they are major report sections. Newer venture agreements proposed to 
maximize First Nation employment levels as opposed to setting levels that reflected the 
minority status of First Nation members in the overall community. The ideas of providing 
training went beyond simple start-up and on-going skills to include advanced training in areas 
of management and value-added manufacturing.
The change in ideas resulted in the emergence of new capacity-building institutions
that increased the involvement of Industry and First Nation actors. Extensive negotiations and
detailed proposals, often carried out with the assistance of government resources, have
become standard requirements in applying for timber licenses that supply joint ventures. The
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increasing use of renewable Forest Licenses, as opposed to temporary Timber Sale Licenses, 
allowed for joint venture partners to take on greater long-term forest management 
responsibilities that include silviculture and harvest planning. Employment screening 
institutions moved away from those only involving the venture management and government- 
sponsored skills training to include community selection committees and members of First 
Nation governance.
In general, it is apparent that the First Nation partners involved in the case ventures 
are increasingly included in policy regimes surrounding local economic development. To a 
great extent, joint venture establishment has been facilitated by a general improvement in the 
government and Industry willingness to involve First Nation communities in economic 
development.
Case Study Successes and Implications
The application of AED capacity-building elements of the case joint ventures are 
summarized in Table 2. Major factors related to each capacity building element are recorded 
for each of the joint ventures examined in this study. Elements indicated as either present or 
not (yes/no) are designated according to how well they corresponded to ideal AED principles 
and community expectations -  as articulated in proposal documents or by community 
representatives. A simple accounting of positive responses recorded for each venture, in 
combination with the analysis of case outcomes, allowed for the joint ventures to be broadly 
categorized by their relative successes. More ideal AED capacity principles were 
consistently incorporated and appropriately applied in Kyahwood and Tl’oh as opposed to 
Dezti or BSW.
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Table 2. AED Capacity Building Characteristics of Indigenous People-Industrv Joint Venture 
Case Studies (1998)
Dezti BSW IrPoh ^ Kyahwood
Operational
Status
Reduced
Capacity
Temporary
Shutdown Operational Operational
Single Nation - - 50% 51%
First Nation 
Ownership Multi-NationConsortium 51% 50% - -
Board of Directors 67% 33% 50% 50%
Management
Participation
Operations
Management.
Committee
Failed to 
emerge
No No 50%
Forestry Planning Yes No Yes No
Management
Style
Culture sensitive 
approaches? Some No
Delegated to 
Nation Some
Training On-the-job Yes Yes Yes Yes
Advanced No No Yes INAC Course
Managerial Some No No No
Apprenticeship 0 1 person 2 persons No
Scholarships No No Yes No
Employment Met proposed 
goals?
Partially Initial goals
Yes Yes
Community Community 
targeted activities? Indirect No Indirect Yes
Recognition Of possible First 
Nation Rights
no prejudice 
clause only 
(Treaty)
no prejudice 
clause only 
(Treaty)
no prejudice 
clause only 
(Treaty)
no prejudice 
clause only 
(Treaty)
Implications
Results from the case study examinations confirmed the importance of AED capacity- 
building elements in the joint ventures that are regarded as relatively successful. Elements 
deemed important included: continuous venture operation; met employment levels; cultural
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considerations; participation of Indigenous People in management; and advanced education 
and training opportunities.
More important for success, however, is a context of collaborative and enhanced 
investment surrounding capacity building elements. The successful case ventures, TP oh and 
Kyahwood, were characterized by capacity building activities undertaken by both partners 
that went beyond immediate need for such things as training for venture start up or standard, 
on-going skills upgrading in first aid and/or lumber grading. The Nak’azdli agreed to 
volunteer their time and resources to manage cultural concerns arising from the Tl’oh 
venture, while Apollo made available scholarship opportunities for advanced technical 
education. In Kyahwood, the Elder Council of Moricetown Band contributed their time to 
interview and consider candidates for employment positions. While Northwood sponsored a 
grand opening community barbecue and has stated openness to sponsoring further 
community-specific activities such as local sports teams.
As apparent in the examined cases, the degree to which the partners were willing to 
further invest in joint venture activities stem from how good the informal partner relations 
were and an appreciation of the mutual benefits of joint ventures. In the successful ventures, 
informal relationships were good; with both First Nation and Industry representatives citing 
mutual benefits as a major factor in motivating joint ventures.
Thus, as a means to encourage and promote enhanced partner investment in capacity 
building elements of joint ventures, efforts should focus on developing relationships and 
partner realization of mutual benefits. However, there are difficulties to making broad 
suggestions on how to improve partner relations, as they are highly personal and context- 
specific. On the other hand, mutual benefits are a subject both partners appreciate and in 
which both have an interest. In fact, a majority of interview respondents cited mutual
benefits as a major motivating factor stimulating joint ventures in BC.
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However, considering circumstances surrounding the case ventures and interviewee 
responses, it seems that a full appreciation of mutual benefits by venture partners may be 
lacking. In all formal interviews, respondents were asked about what they felt was motivating 
joint ventures in BC. Aceording to First Nation respondents, the top three factors motivating 
joint ventures were, in order of frequency of response: mutual benefits; timber company 
interest in securing forest license investments; and First Nation activism. Industry 
representatives identified the following motivating factors: investment security; access to 
additional wood supplies; and mutual benefits. Aside from ‘mutual benefits’, a majority of 
responses had antagonistic or ‘self-interest’ connotations with respect to motivating factors. 
Similar motives were suggested by First Nation representatives and local Ministry of Forests 
staff I informally interviewed (Pers. Comm., Cliff Lebron, Quesnel, 1998; John Gray, 
Aboriginal Affairs, MOF Prince George Forest Region, 1997). Further, a majority of 
Industry and First Nation representatives viewed joint ventures strictly as employment- 
generating business ventures and investments. Although acknowledging that ventures 
provided opportunities for capacity building, representatives were more commonly concemed 
with business viability and survival. With significant investments made in, and community 
jobs depending on joint ventures. First Nation stakeholders shared similar business viability 
concerns to those of Industry. In fact, the most common criticisms made by First Nation 
representatives unhappy with their particular venture were with respect to the poor or nil rate 
of returns on their substantial investments.
If the venture partners were to closely examine present, as well as potential benefit
aspects of joint ventures, they would discover that significant mutual interests are being
addressed. Ventures are allowing both parties to explore new businesses in value-added
wood products whose markets will increasingly play a role in the future profitability of forest
industries. As Marchak (1983) warns, forest economies largely based on primary lumber
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manufacturing, such as EC’s, face certain difficulty as new, cheaper primary sources emerge 
when vast southem-hemisphere plantations mature in the near future. Forest companies with 
significant value-added manufacturing capability are better able to capture emerging markets 
for high-value, engineered wood-products and would be more insulated from effects of the 
consistent downturns in primary lumber markets (Forest Renewal BC, 2000).
Aside from economic benefits and participation in modem economic ventures, joint 
ventures also represent an opportunity for First Nations to reduce government control over 
the agenda of economic development in their communities: a step toward self-determination. 
As Chief Harold Prince of the Nak’adzli notes, “Joint ventures are providing First Nations a 
greater sense of control over what happens to their [natural] resources”(Pers. Comm., July
1998). Brian Yellowhom of the Williams Lake Band suggests that joint ventures are helping 
devolve authority over natural resource development under circumstances where, despite the 
rhetoric, government is still hesitant to give up control (Pers. Comm. August, 1998).
Given a better appreciation of mutual benefits, it is in the best interest of both partners 
to provide enhanced levels of investment in joint venture activities. This is especially true if 
the parties wish to capture lucrative value-added forest product markets, in which production 
processes demand a highly skilled, flexible workforce and adaptive production techniques 
(Hayter and Barnes 1997). Joint venture employees will not only need technical training in 
workshop and business administration skills but also advanced creative skills in such areas as 
marketing, product design and dynamic employee organization. Making mutual concessions 
through enhanced investments, even if relatively minor in nature, go a long way to 
developing a positive working relationship. With strong commitment on behalf of both 
partners, it is possible to find the means to implement more costly and time consuming 
capacity-building activities such as advanced creative training.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions and Recommendations
A goal of this study has been to examine how joint venture arrangements address 
capacity building for Aboriginal Economic Development (AED) in Indigenous communities. 
Insight is drawn from both literature and case examples to provide recommendations of how 
to improve joint venture arrangements for optimal AED capacity building.
In order to meet the stated goal a series of objectives were set. The first objective was 
to situate AED within the context of broader economic development. I then argued that 
promotion of joint ventures between Indigenous People and Industry in BC represents a 
movement toward policy regimes - typical of commonwealth countries - that entrench private 
partnerships as a government strategy for developing capacities for AED. Lastly, I set out to 
establish whether CED/AED capacity building elements were utilized in forestry joint 
ventures and contributed to their relative successes.
The literature review into the progression of approaches to AED by development 
organizations and nation-states - particularly those with a British colonial tradition - suggest 
the emergence of an economic development approach which highlights joint ventures. In the 
early stages of contact with western cultures, development programs centred on adapting 
Indigenous People involved in subsistence-trading economies to participate in a westernized, 
wage-based economy. As official assimilation policies were largely abandoned and colonial 
economic expansion exhausted, nation-states in the 1970s sought to improve the economic 
conditions of rural and Indigenous communities through the capture of economic spin-offs 
from energy and natural resource sector developments that were undertaken by the most 
efficient private sector operators; corporations. By the 1980s, mainstream efforts at 
CED/AED were geared to developing the capacity of Indigenous Peoples to participate in
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applicable economic sectors with a degree of autonomy and cultural integrity intact. Most 
recent CED/AED approaches have tended to utilize government programs to bring 
Indigenous People, who have some degree of recognized status, to a basic level of education 
that will allow them to participate and gain experience in economic activities largely 
undertaken by the private sector. At the same time, activities that work toward building the 
capacities of Indigenous People to participate in the broader economy have increasingly been 
implemented by the private sector.
Chapter two demonstrated the existence of natural resource development policy 
regimes within the diverse government frameworks of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
the Province of British Columbia that involve the use of collaborative partnerships. A 
paradigm shift popularizing sustainable economic development of natural resources and 
advances in legal recognition of the rights of Indigenous People in the late 1980s, resulted in 
policy regimes where Indigenous People first secured greater collaborative roles with 
government and then with both government and Industry. Governments moved away from a 
focus on Industry-led, market-based development to include working with Indigenous People 
on communal and culturally appropriate options such as land trusts/leases, local product 
enterprises (plant and animal products, crafts and foodstuffs) and community economic 
development institutions. By casting legal uncertainty over government authority for lands 
and resources, landmark legal determinations such as Mabo 2 (1992) in Australia, 
Delgamuukw (1997) in Canada and New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1990), 
served to increase Industry’s interest in collaborative participation with Indigenous People in 
economic development. Progressive government institutions such as legislated enactments 
and interim measures boards stimulated greater Industry participation in economic 
development with Indigenous People in joint ventures and other economic collaborations.
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The overall trend for increased government, Industry and Indigenous involvement in 
current policy regimes is illustrated through the case example of the British Columbia 
government divesting development responsibilities such as training and employment 
generation to collaborative partnerships and joint ventures between Industry and First Nation 
groups. As illustrated in Chapter 5, a similar policy trend was also reflected in local-level 
policy regime ideas and institutions surrounding the case ventures. Venture establishment 
included the mandatory use of comprehensive negotiation and proposal stages that were 
locally developed by district-level ministries, Industry field-office staff and specific First 
Nations. Local Industry, government and First Nation organizations worked to 
collaboratively implement training activities. In sum, local policy regimes involving specific 
First Nation groups. Industry field-office staff, and district-level MOF personnel included 
similar components and processes as policy regimes occurring at federal and province levels.
Another objective of this thesis was to establish what capacity-building components, 
as identified in the CED/AED literature, were applied in ventures and to analyze the results. 
Capacity-building components were identified in a review of CED/AED literature and 
confirmed during the case study interview process. Indigenous ownership, management 
participation, employment, advanced training and recognition of culture were considered 
important capacity-building components and applied, to varying degrees, in the case ventures 
examined. An analysis was then undertaken in Chapter 5 to examine the relative successes 
and failures of case venture activities with respect to capacity-building components of AED.
From the case analysis a number of generalizations and recommendations can be
drawn concerning the effectiveness of value-added forest products joint ventures at
developing capacities for AED. However, it is important to stress that the generalizations
face certain limitations. As the theoretical framework used in this thesis is based on a political
pluralist conception - which views that central concerns of communities are represented
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through local governments and organizations - the full potential of community concerns and 
local economies may not be expressed and/or addressed. Furthermore, unique community 
contexts influencing joint ventures, such as venture partner relations can vary how capacity- 
building components address AED.
High levels of First Nation ownership in joint ventures are important for capacity 
building. Limited ownership levels of 50%-51% are appropriate in that they provide a 
manageable balance that minimizes legal and financial risk, affords equal or greater 
management participation, and leave open a possibility for future increased ownership levels. 
However, ownership levels that minimize risk may also inhibit future increases in First 
Nation ownership. Capacity-building benefit of increased or majority ownership levels in 
ventures depends on longer-term economic strategies of First Nation partners. Regardless, it 
is necessary for the issue of future ownership enhancement to be specifically addressed in 
joint venture negotiations; and then periodically reviewed over time. If majority ownership is 
obtained too quickly, parallel First Nation goals of minimizing risk and increasing 
management participation with Industry may be at risk.
Ventures with ownership structures involving consortia of diverse First Nation groups 
may realize fewer capacity-building activities and develop significant levels of conflict if all 
collaborating parties are not fully aware of their rights, responsibilities and share of benefits.
It is possible that such conflict could be avoided in the future by introducing means to 
improve communication between consortium representatives and their community members. 
Possible mechanisms include the development of communication/negotiation skills of 
consortium officers, transparent reporting of on-going consortium performance and benefits, 
clear guidelines for consortium collaboration, and more comprehensive community 
representation in formal joint venture negotiations.
I l l
Industry partner support of continued venture operations is crucial to the economic 
goals of First Nations. If unsupported, ventures that are subject to the market downturns 
characteristic of the forest sector, could face quick ruin, especially if downturns occur in the 
early stages of venture operations. In this study Industry partners have demonstrated a 
willingness to support, to varying degrees, continued operation of ventures during economic 
downturns.
Maximized levels of First Nation employment in joint ventures is another important 
factor in building capacity. Successful case ventures met or exceeded First Nation 
employment goals (85% of workforce or greater). Given the possibility of high employee 
turnover rates, venture agreements should include strategies to ensure that First Nation 
employment goals are maintained. Possible strategies include utilizing a First Nation- 
managed employee pool to ensure availability of suitable employee candidates and 
implementing a review process to examine reasons behind high employee turnover rates. 
Given that, over time, expectations seem to vary from those outlined in official start-up 
agreements, employment goals and concerns should be periodically re-examined to ensure 
they are congruent with community expectation, needs and performance.
Typical training involved in joint ventures contributes to capacity-building in that 
many activities go beyond standard, skills-upgrading training (relatively standard industry 
procedures) to involve instruction for worker transition/preparedness and supervisor skills for 
new employees. However, funding and commitment to on-going training of this nature is 
typically not provided. It cannot be expected that fledgling ventures, once operations have 
commenced, would be viewed as self-reliant, efficient economic agents, and then divested of 
developmental support. Within the context of current approaches to training, one 
recommendation was to utilize a First Nation-managed employee pool to administer cost-
effective group training sessions for both employees and potential employees.
112
Joint ventures address First Nation interest in management participation with industry 
in venture-related economic and forest resource activities by involving high levels of First 
Nation representation on venture Boards of Directors (BODs), the provision of floor-level 
supervisor positions and contractor opportunities for forest planning and harvesting.
BOD representation is the primary mechanism for First Nation participation in the 
management of joint venture activities. As is typical in the examined case ventures, equal 
First Nation and Industry representation on BODs is considered an optimum level in that 
contentious management decisions cannot be forced through by veto of a dominant party. 
Rather, all parties are required to reach consensus through some process of negotiation and 
collaboration. Through BOD participation. First Nations are privy to broad-level management 
decision making within a learning environment where all directors are exploring relatively 
unfamiliar techniques and strategies of innovative, value-added businesses. However, 
management decisions at the BOD level tend to be broad and conceptual. Unless First Nation 
directors are also directly involved in venture-related operations, BOD representation may 
offer little comprehensive participation in venture management. It is recommended that at 
least some, if not all. First Nation directors be employed or involved in management activities 
of venture and forest management operations.
Joint ventures are less effective at involving First Nation member participation in
supervisory positions and forest management planning. On the positive side, most ventures
make available supervisory positions which First Nation members and employees can
endeavor to attain. As prospective community role models, motivated members show the
greatest potential for achievement both within the venture itself and/or in utilizing their skills
in other economic activities in the community. However, supervisor positions in small-sized,
value-added manufacturing ventures offer limited opportunity for professional advancement
and employ only a very small percentage of First Nation members. Greater opportunities for
113
supervisory positions and advancement opportunities are needed. As demonstrated in the 
more recently negotiated case ventures (Tl’oh & Dezti), ideal methods to improve 
opportunities include the provision of advanced education prospects in value-added/resource 
management and a greater number of employment positions that include possibilities for 
professional advancement. Advancement opportunities in venture-related activities external 
to venture facilities such as First Nation/Industry planning departments, mills, and other 
economic pursuits should be explored.
Joint ventures are involving First Nations in forest management related activities 
through responsibilities in contract harvesting operations and in some aspects of procurement 
and management of minor timber supply tenures. As many First Nations, especially at the 
beginning of a venture, agree to have Industry partners assume responsibilities for planning 
and management activities, it is important to ensure that First Nations become more 
progressively involved in resource management. Opportunities for planning participation are 
further limited if the timber tenures that supply ventures, such as EC’s Timber Sale License, 
have few requirements for resource stewardship. Where First Nation partners retain planning 
responsibilities, motivation to minimize risk may often lead First Nation managers to contract 
out planning and fieldwork obligations to experienced consulting firms. As often is the case 
in both Industry and consultant planning departments, some First Nation employment 
positions are made available in venture-related, field-level planning activities such as 
surveying and harvest layout. However, such positions may provide employees with little 
exposure to processes involved in development and approval of comprehensive tenure 
management plans.
As minimized-liability ownership in ventures and limited obligation TSL licenses act
as barriers to increased First Nation participation, venture agreements should integrate
options for future increased ownership levels and include timber supply licenses that involve
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a greater diversity of terms and conditions. A potential mechanism to increase First Nation 
participation in forest management planning would be to establish a number of employment 
positions within Industry and consultant planning departments that provide a balance of field 
and office responsibilities.
A major weakness of joint ventures in developing capacity for AED is the lack of 
integration of First Nation culture in economic activities. First Nation partners can expect 
ventures to involve legal guarantees to not prejudice treaty issues and some indirect 
community benefits from conventional Industry donations for such things as sport team 
sponsorships and local community charities. However, ventures involve almost no 
mechanisms to improve cultural sensitivity of operations or recognition of the rights of First 
Nations. Innovative activities such as cross-cultural training for employees and supervisors 
and culturally-adapted management approaches -  typically found in progressive 
energy/mining sector collaborations with First Nations -  are not often utilized in forestry 
joint ventures.
Given their contributions in successful ventures, integration of First Nation 
institutions in venture operations. First Nation-theme product symbols/venture regalia, 
targeted community funding, and cross-cultural training for both aboriginal and non­
aboriginal employees are ideal means to integrate culture into economic activities, develop 
positive working environments and improve First Nation-Industry relations. As was 
identified in this research, a successful relationship between venture partners requires 
collaboration, respect and adaptability beyond the provisions of any legal or business 
document.
In sum, capacity building components involved in joint ventures do not completely
fulfil criteria of an ideal approach to AED. Generally, there are no mechanisms involved that
provide inclusive community participation, conflict resolution and integration of culture in
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either venture-related activities or the determination of the overall nature of local economic 
development and share of benefits. First Nations do not retain full ownership of the factors 
of economic production nor do they share control with Industry or the government in the 
management of natural resources on traditional territories. Furthermore, ventures provide 
minimal opportunities for the majority of First Nation employees to obtain much needed 
advanced education/skills and professional promotion.
Nonetheless, activities involved in joint ventures do address and/or introduce aspects 
of capacity building for AED within the context of venture-related economic development. 
On their own accord, First Nations are pursuing joint ventures in value-added forest products 
industries that provide them with unprecedented levels of ownership and BOD management 
participation; often under circumstances where First Nations have never before held any form 
of control in viable manufacturing facilities. Joint venture activities involve the hiring and 
training of a high number of First Nation members who lack formal skills and education for 
employment in the production of value-added forest products and, to a lesser extent, in 
resource management fieldwork. Highly motivated First Nation employees and members 
who show the greatest potential for professional development and probability of transferring 
skills to other economic activities undertaken in First Nation communities are identified and 
employed in supervisory positions with limited advancement potential.
It is clear that joint ventures alone cannot address all aspects of capacity building 
required for First Nations to realize goals for AED. The larger First Nation -  Government -  
Industry policy regimes surrounding joint ventures need to engage more inclusive forms of 
First Nation and non-aboriginal governance, improved First Nation involvement with 
government in the co-management of natural resources, and greater venture partner 
commitment to building capacities and relationships with local First Nation communities.
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As demonstrated in the case studies, joint ventures applying elevated levels of 
capacity-building components experienced more relative successes and better Industry-First 
Nation relations than ventures that include fewer components. What is also revealed is that 
barriers to implementing capacity building activities may stem from venture partners’ short­
term-economic perspectives, a lack of full appreciation of the mutual benefits, and overall 
strained relations between Industry and First Nations.
An appreciation of the mutual benefits that stem from successful joint ventures is key 
to motivating partners to further invest in capacity building activities. Joint ventures are 
allowing both parties to explore new business opportunities in potentially lucrative value- 
added forest products markets. They also allow the parties new access to previously 
unavailable resources and lands within evolving Indigenous People-Industry policy regimes 
that are providing greater opportunities for a reduction of bureaucratic inefficiencies (timber 
license constraints) and self-determined Indigenous stewardship/control over lands and 
resources. Greater partner investments in joint ventures not only enhance mutual benefits but 
also go a long way to improving overall partner relations. With a respectful and collaborative 
relationship, there are good opportunities to achieve venture successes and capacity building 
that at one time may have been unimaginable.
Contributions of the Study
It is inevitable that the way joint ventures address capacity building for AED will
constantly evolve according to developments in value-added forest product markets, political
and legal advances regarding the rights of Indigenous People, economic development theories
and treaty negotiations. As the right for Indigenous People to be involved in the management
of natural resources and economic development is translated into tangible economic ventures
and arrangements, Industry, government and Indigenous planners must have a good working
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knowledge of the unique conditions and history of formal economic collaborations between 
Industry and Indigenous Peoples.
Future Research
Collaborative Indigenous-Industry joint ventures in renewable resource use are a very 
new form of business partnership. The long-term sustainability of ventures, and the 
socioeconomic contributions they will make to Indigenous Peoples is still uncertain. As 
recent, privately negotiated ventures have become more innovative, compared to older 
economic relationships with industries that largely involved only spin-off benefits, examples 
of emerging joint ventures should be examined to inform Indigenous communities, business, 
development research, governments and the public.
Some specific aspects of joint ventures that need further exploration include economic 
viability of value-added forest products manufacturing, community involvement and benefits 
in joint venture-related AED, and the organizational development of Indigenous enterprises. 
Since advances in AED capacity-building in any value-added forest products joint venture 
depends on the venture’s viability, it is important to determine the full spectrum of economic 
prospects: short, medium and long term.
At least two case study respondents suggested that First Nation-Industry 
collaborations should move away from strictly wood products manufacture and diversify into 
other highly promising sectors such as First Nation-theme tourism, certified wood products, 
and the manufacture of needed forest machinery components such as hydraulic fittings. As 
respondents have suggested, putting the central focus of economic development programs on 
status quo forest sector development, leaves fledgling First Nation economic institutions and 
their communities open to the social and economic ills of resource dependent economies.
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Economie diversification should make up a good part of the contextual framework in which 
industrial collaborations need to be applied.
Almost no research has been carried out with respect to community involvement in 
joint venture-related AED. Community perceptions, needs and benefits with respect to joint 
venture-inspired economic development should be explored. Related efforts should focus on 
developing methods to improve civil institutions of First Nation communities involved in 
joint venture businesses. Fair, transparent and participatory governance and economic 
systems, grounded in First Nation cultural and tradition, are required to fully represent First 
Nation communities.
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Appendix 1
Examples of Legal Partnership Mechanisms 
Partnerships
Legal Partnerships can be broadly categorized into two types: Partnerships and 
Limited Partnerships.
Also known as firms, partnerships are characterized by the following: All partners 
have equal share in a) management of the operation b) income c) assets d) liability and debts 
of the partnership e) access to financial statements of the partnership and f) capital 
contributions. Partnerships involve fiduciary duty in that partners must act in good faith with 
respect to other partners and the partnership itself. All partners must act in the best interest of 
the partnership above and beyond personal interest (Van Duzer, 1997)
Partnerships in Canada are subject to specific provincial legislation. However, unlike 
other forms of business relationships -  excepting sole proprietorships -  a partnership need 
not be formalized to exist. Once partners get together to start a profit making business, it is 
automatically a partnership, and therefore subject to the force of law (Kerr & Kurtz, 1998).
Despite the ease of formation and benefits of shared management, partnerships suffer 
from a number of drawbacks: a) they are easily dissolved b) involve personal partner liability 
for partnership debts, losses and liabilities c) have unfavorable tax rates for high income 
ventures and d) partner assets including land title become the property of the partnership. As 
a result of these limitations, added negotiations and unanimously decided legal partnership 
agreements are often required to both meet partner concerns and guard against unforeseen 
events (VanDuzer, 1997). Of particular concern to First Nation investors is exposure to 
liabilities and the possibility of third party alienation of land title.
132
Limited Partnership
Limited partnerships alleviate some of the partnership concerns by allowing for 
varying levels of partner contributions and responsibilities that are subject to limited 
liabilities. With a requirement for legal registration, a limited partnership has at least one 
general partner with legal partnership liabilities and one or more limited partners. Retaining 
partnership-like rights such as the ability to examine financial statements and fiduciary 
obligations to act in good faith, a limited partner is entitled to a share of profits and liability 
commensurable to their capital contributions. Further, both general and limited partners 
enjoy tax benefits as loss deductions are transferable (Kerr and Kuntz, 1998). The downside 
is that without a partnership agreement, the ability for the limited partner to share in 
management responsibilities is restricted.
In most business situations limited partners are more interested in a secure return on a 
limited investment in a stable business activity and less interested in management details. As 
is implied in First Nation-Industry partnerships occurring in BC, First Nation participation in 
management is an important goal. However, by simply adhering to a legal limited 
partnership framework, management participation could be adverse to a limited First Nations 
partner’s overall business interests. As set out in Ontario legislation, a limited partner is 
subject to losing limited liability if that partner “ .. .takes part in the control of the business...” 
rather than in an advisory role (VanDuzer, 1997, p.60). Again, mutually determined 
partnership agreements must be used mitigate special concerns of individual partners.
Corporations
A business corporation is a legally enacted entity that enjoys legal rights and
obligations -  including borrowing - similar to individuals. Business liabilities incurred are
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restricted to the corporation and its assets and not the owners/co-owners (shareholders) who 
simply risk their investments. In addition to reduced liability, corporate status benefits 
(owners) shareholders through tax advantages, transferable business interests (shares) and the 
ability to use the corporation as lending equity (Kerr and Kuntz, 1998).
Management of a corporation is carried out by a board of shareholder elected 
directors and director appointed officers. Although shareholders have a say in the overall 
direction of the corporation by such means as the ability to vote in directors, they are usually 
not involved in management. However, since election of directors and other matters are 
predominantly carried out by majority vote, a minority shareholder’s ability to influence 
management is diminished. This remains an important concern for BC First Nation partners 
as economic collaboration tends to be with large forestry corporations having many 
shareholders. In many BC corporate collaborations. First Nation concerns over their minority 
stakeholder position have been address through such means as establishing stronger First 
Nation representation on BODs. As stated by VanDuzer (1997), such negotiated 
arrangements are extra to the basic legal corporate framework.
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Appendix 2
Interview Guide for Research Interviews
Interviewer_____________________________  Date;
Respondent ID #.
Approximate Interview Duration: I Hour
1. Introduce topic and inform respondent of her/his rights in the study and particulars of the interview process.
2. Co-sign the Participant Agreement of Consent form with the respondent.
3. Interview Questions
Joint Venture Description
A. Can you describe the nature of the joint-venture?
B. How was the joint venture initiated? Was there any gov’t involvement?
C. How are First Nations involved in management o f operations? i.e. resource mgmt. planning, operations, etc.
D. Does either the jt-venture or the parent company have policies and procedures in place concerning aboriginal 
relations? Describe.
Employment
A. What types of employment have directly resulted from the joint-venture?
i) Of the positions what percentage are management related?
ii) What are the opportunities for advancement?
B. Were any positions adapted to meet aboriginal concerns? i.e. flexibility of time o ff periods, etc.
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i) If joint-venture is a subsidiary of or managed by a larger company, how closely does it reflect 
management principals of the larger firm?
C. Is there any commitment to principals of Total Quality Management?(employee centred production)
Contractors
A. If any, can you describe the nature of preferential contracting arrangements? 
i) What percentage o f native contractors were pre-existing?
B. Were there any efforts to support management capacity of new contractors 
i.e. Explain procurement procedures
C. What types o f indirect employment opportunities are the result of the joint-venture? 
(i.e. maintenance, supplies, ect )
D. Can you describe the working relationship between native contractors and the jt-venture company? 
(Involved in company training, meetings, etc?)
Skills and Training
A. Were there any training programs involved in the set up of the jt-venture? Explain, 
(employment readiness courses, cross-cultural, etc.)
i) Did other agencies help with facilitating training? (gov’ts/band leadership) How?
B. Were there any arrangements made for scholarships, apprenticeships, etc?
C. What types of training are involved on an on-going basis?
Capital
A. By what mechanism are joint-ventures contributing capital to First Nations?
(i.e. shareholder dividends, finance collateral(secure resource tenure), infrastructure, royalties, etc) 
i) Can you give a rough estimate of the value of capital input?
B. % profits re-invested ? local or external investments?
C. Has the partnership changed investment climate for the jt.venture? parent company? 
Value of shares changed? Shareholder confidence?
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Capacity Building
A. How are links between First Nations gov’t/community and joint-venture maintained?
(board of directors representation, forestry relations persons, etc. )
i) Do agreements and correspondence acknowledge possible First Nation rights to land and resources?
B. Is there any involvement of the jt-venture corporation in First Nations gov’t ?(committees, advisors, etc.)
C. Is jt-venture corporation involved in community outreach? (school visits, sponsor community events, etc.) 
General Questions
Has the advent of joint-venture(s) changed the historic relationship between First Nations and forestry 
companies in the area? between gov’t ? public?
What do you helieve is motivating joint-ventures between First Nations and Forest Companies?
What role do you feel jt-ventures are playing for First Nations? 
Forest Companies? Gov’ts?
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Appendix 3
List of Interviewed Participants for the Case Study Analysis
Name Title Organization Location Venture
Relation
Date
Barry Metzner Manager BSW Bums Lake BSW Aug 4/98
Patrick Kohlo General
Manager
Bums Lake 
Native Logging
Bums Lake BSW Aug 4/98
Wes Boehmer Manager BLNL Bums Lake BSW June 12, 98 
Nov 99
Chief Robert 
Charlie
Band Chief Bums Lake 
Band
Bums Lake BSW June 98
Rod Beaumont Chief Forester Weldwood of 
Canada Ltd
Vancouver BSW/
General
Oct 16/98
Frank Michelle Economic Dev. 
Officer
Babine Lake 
Band
Bums Lake BSW/
General
June 98
Ted Anthony Manager Plateau Forest 
Products
Vanderhoof Dezti Nov 25/99
George Lacerte Director NeDuchun 
Forest Products
Vanderhoof Dezti Nov 24/99
Martine Louie Chief Nadleh Whutén 
Nation
Fort Fraser Dezti June/98
Kate Movin Economic Dev. 
Officer
Nadleh Whutén 
Nation
Fort Fraser General/
Dezti
July 9/98
Jacqueline
Thomas
Chief Saik’uz Nation Stoney Creek Dezti Sept 3/98
Mike Robertson Economic Dev. 
Officer
Cheslatta Nation Francois
Lake
General August
5/98
Del Blackstock Business Officer Carrier-Sekanni Prince
George
General May 13/98
Wayne
Boudreau
Manager Tolko Forest 
Products
Quesnel General July, 20/98
138
Name Title Organization Location Venture
Relation
Date
William
Ostenstad
Economic Dev. 
Officer
Nazko First 
Nation
Quesnel General July 24/98
Cliff Lebron Economic Dev. 
Officer
Lhatako Dene 
Nation
Quesnel General August
18/98
Graham
McIntosh
Forester West Fraser 
Mills Ltd.
Williams
Lake
General August
18/98
Brian
Yellowhom
Band Manager Williams Lake 
Band
Williams
Lake
General August
18/98
Petr Cizek Planner Cizek Enviro. 
Services
Yellowknife General July 97
John Gray Aboriginal
Affairs
Ministry of
Forests
(regional)
Prince
George
General Oct. 97
Paul Mitchell- 
Banks
First Nation
Forestry
Consultant
Central Coast 
Consulting
Vancouver General March 98
Merv Work Manager Tloh Ft.St. James Tloh June 19/98
Harold Prince Chief Nakazdli First 
Nation
Ft.St. James Tloh July 23/98
Scott Shettel Manager Apollo Forest 
Products
Ft.St. James Tloh July 10/98
Leonard
Thomas
Representative Carrier-Sekanni 
Tribal Council
Prince
George
Tloh Nov 26/99
Ronald Mitchell Band Manager Moricetown
Band
Moricetown Kyahwood Dec 10/99
Terry Lalonde Manager Kyahwood Moricetown Kyahwood June 25/98
Graeme Hynd Forest Officer MOF Smithers Kyahwood June 24/98
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